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INTRODUCTION 
Certain cases live long in the legal imagination.  One prime example of 
this is the Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,1 
which has been described as “one of the modern cornerstones of our 
federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of 
judicial power between the state and federal systems”2 and as “a star of the 
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1  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
2  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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first magnitude in the legal universe.”3  As almost every first-year law 
student comes to know,4 the so-called “Erie doctrine”5 generally requires 
federal courts to apply the law of the state in which the court sits, unless the 
matter before the court is governed by the Constitution, a federal statute, a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, or a federal practice, such as whether 
federal damages law should overcome a state practice.6  Since the Erie 
decision, the Supreme Court has sought to settle the doctrine’s puzzles in a 
series of cases (including one in the 2009 Term)7 involving the interplay 
between federal and state laws and procedural rules.8 
One such Erie puzzle involves the choice of applicable substantive law 
in federal courts when a legal dispute crosses state borders.  Which state’s 
law should apply when the laws of more than one state are potentially 
applicable to a case?  The Supreme Court provided an answer to that 
question in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., when it held 
that a federal court must apply not only state substantive law but also state 
conflict-of-laws rules.9  So, for instance, if a case with California and 
Virginia contacts comes before a Virginia federal district court sitting in 
diversity,10 the federal court must apply the conflict-of-laws rules of the 
 
3  BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 272 n.4 (1977).  Less 
fawningly, it has also been described as a “myth” and a “religion” that has “accumulated a fringe of 
extremists, cultists and fanatics.”  See, e.g., Marian O. Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial 
Precedent: II, 40 TEX. L. REV. 619, 635 (1962) (“Like a religion, Erie . . . has its dissenters and 
protestants.”); Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 596–97 (2008) (“The old 
myth is the Court’s original claim that its decision had a valid constitutional basis. . . . [T]he new 
separation-of-powers myth[] [is that] Erie was chiefly concerned with stripping the unguided 
policymaking authority that federal courts had exercised under Swift v. Tyson.”). 
4  See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme 
Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 
1015 (1998) (noting that the Erie decision is “a key part of the rite of passage through which most of us 
went and continue to put our students”). 
5  See generally Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the 
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 261–67 (2008) 
(providing a recent explanation of the doctrine). 
6  Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996); see also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465 
(explaining that “federal courts sitting in diversity cases . . . are to apply state substantive law and 
federal procedural law”). 
7  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (holding that a state 
may foreclose class action aggregation of state law claims in federal court). 
8  See, e.g., Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427; Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); 
Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 460; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural 
Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
9  313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
10  One exception that I note here in the interest of completeness but will not discuss in the main text 
is that if the case comes before a Virginia federal district court sitting in diversity by way of a transfer of 
venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006), the federal district court must apply the conflict-of-laws rules that 
would have been followed by the transferring court.  See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 
519 (1990) (holding that transferee court must apply the law of the transferor court); Van Dusen v. 
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964) (holding that transferee court must apply the law of the transferor 
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state courts of Virginia, which, depending on the facts of the case, may 
direct the federal court to apply Virginia substantive law or the substantive 
law of another state.11  In the Court’s view, to do otherwise “would 
constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and 
federal courts sitting side by side” and “would do violence to the principle 
of uniformity within a state, upon which the [Erie] decision is based.”12  
This holding, while well settled, is not without vigorous criticism.13 
Nearly all of the cases considering the Erie doctrine have arisen in the 
context of either federal/state relations (whether federal or state laws and 
procedural rules control) or state/state relations (whether the laws of State A 
or State B control).14  While the Erie doctrine may make sense in the 
domestic context given that, as a constitutional matter, states and their 
citizens must be treated equally,15 another Erie question arises in the 
international context—namely, must a federal court apply the law of a 
foreign country when directed by state conflict-of-laws rules?  What 
happens when the Erie doctrine goes international?16 
The Supreme Court resolved this subpuzzle within the larger 
Erie/Klaxon puzzle in a short, per curiam opinion in Day & Zimmermann, 
Inc. v. Challoner, which held that federal courts must apply state conflict-
 
court when a defendant moves for transfer). 
11  See, e.g., Consulting Eng’rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 280 & n.6 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(explaining Virginia’s conflict-of-laws rules); Limbach Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 396 F.3d 358, 361–
62 (4th Cir. 2005) (illustrating that Virginia’s conflict-of-laws rules may direct the application of 
another state’s substantive law). 
12  Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496. 
13  See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 671–85 (6th ed. 
2010) (collecting sources detailing both sides of the debate).  But see, e.g., DAVID F. CAVERS, THE 
CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 222 (1965) (opposing overruling Klaxon because that would lead to “a return 
to the familiar, mechanical formulas which have always been defended on the thesis (however illusory) 
that they achieve uniformity and certainty” and “a nostalgic search for a doctrinal lowest common 
denominator”); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 714 n.125 (1974) 
(defending Klaxon’s implementation of the Erie doctrine). 
14  See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996); Stewart Org., Inc. v. 
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987); Hanna v. Plumer, 
380 U.S. 460, 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty Trust 
Co. v. York, 326 U.S 99, 99 (1945). 
15  See generally Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The 
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992) (noting that the equal 
protection and privileges and immunities doctrines protect citizens of the several states from 
discrimination in choice of law). 
16  In this Article, I will use “international conflict of laws” as shorthand for a case in which a U.S. 
court is asked to apply foreign, non-U.S. law.  The discussion that follows will involve the Erie 
doctrine’s application to foreign law, which I define as the law of a foreign state (e.g., the United 
Kingdom or France) as opposed to sister-state law (e.g., the law of California or Virginia), which is also 
“foreign” law for conflicts purposes but not the foreign law that is the subject here.  See, e.g., id. at 259 
(noting the distinction). 
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of-laws rules, even when those rules direct the court to apply the 
substantive law of a foreign country.17  According to the Day Court, “[a] 
federal court in a diversity case is not free to engraft onto those state rules 
exceptions or modifications which may commend themselves to the federal 
court, but which have not commended themselves to the State in which the 
federal court sits.”18  On account of this mandate, federal courts uncritically 
apply conflict-of-laws rules of the several states that direct them to apply 
the substantive law of foreign states.19 
The purpose of this Article is to unsettle the quiescent waters of this 
Erie/Klaxon subpuzzle in private international law cases.  It may be asked: 
If the law is so settled, why unsettle it and perhaps further befuddle 
generations of lawyers and law students whose only hope has been to find 
any semblance of consistency in the dictates of the Erie doctrine?  Three 
preliminary answers can be given. 
First, it is a mistake to treat international and domestic conflict-of-laws 
cases in the same way because “international choice of law requires more 
flexibility than domestic choice of law.”20  As will be discussed below,21 
while the Constitution, the Rules of Decision Act, the Rules Enabling Act, 
and various policy considerations may require the application of the laws of 
the several states, these same sources should not be read as similarly and 
automatically requiring the application of the laws of foreign states because 
the application of foreign law, unlike sister-state law, is entirely voluntary.22  
As one leading scholar has explained, “[t]o apply mechanically a rule 
developed in interstate cases to an international situation without 
consideration of its policy relevance is both wrong and dangerous.”23 
Second, the Erie doctrine should be updated to meet the realities of 
private international law litigation today.  To the extent there is increased 
 
17  423 U.S. 3, 3–4 (1975). 
18  Id. at 4.  There is a split of authority as to whether this holding applies to courts sitting under 
original jurisdiction.  Compare Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Fed. Express Corp., 189 F.3d 914, 919–20 (9th Cir. 
1999) (applying Erie principles), with Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 83 F.3d 127, 130 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(applying a federal common law rule). 
19  See, e.g., Abogados v. AT&T, Inc., 223 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Mexican law); 
Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 1999) (also applying Mexican law); Brink’s Ltd. 
v. S. African Airways, 93 F.3d 1022 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying South African law); CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin, 
639 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (applying Canadian law); Faggionato v. Lerner, 500 F. Supp. 2d 
237 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (applying French law). 
20  Laycock, supra note 15, at 260. 
21  See infra Part III. 
22  See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 23 (1834) (“[W]hatever 
force and obligation the laws of one country have in another, depends solely upon the laws, and 
municipal regulations of the latter, that is to say, upon its own proper jurisprudence and polity, and upon 
its own express or tacit consent.”). 
23  Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the United 
States, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1599, 1599–1600 (1966). 
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private international law litigation in U.S. courts,24 these Erie questions will 
arise with more frequency.  To the extent they arise, courts should question 
the mechanistic application of a doctrine announced in the 1930s (and 
updated to conflict-of-laws cases in the 1940s and 1970s) to the realities of 
today, especially in light of more recent Supreme Court cases concerning 
constitutional constraints on choice of law.25 
Third, the answer also lies in the fact that the animating ethos of the 
Erie doctrine is perhaps thwarted by its application in private international 
cases.  If the Erie doctrine is about separation of powers and federalism,26 
then requiring federal courts to uncritically apply foreign law does little to 
effectuate these goals.  Furthermore, state conflict-of-laws rules requiring 
the application of foreign substantive law might not advance Erie’s twin 
aims: “discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable 
administration of the laws.”27  These aims must be balanced against the 
strength of having a consistent federal policy.  This Article shows through 
empirical analysis that “forum shopping” might be encouraged by the Erie 
doctrine’s application to cases involving foreign law.  The discussion of 
forum shopping uncovers a previously unrecognized connection in the 
scholarly literature: internationalizing the Erie doctrine may in part explain 
the increased use of the forum non conveniens doctrine by federal district 
courts.28  Put another way, courts should perhaps critically evaluate whether 
the application of state conflict-of-laws rules requiring the application of 
foreign substantive law effectuates Erie’s aims. 
Surprisingly, little scholarly attention has been paid to this question in 
recent years.  While seminal articles have been written applying the lessons 
of Erie to customary international law29 and have engendered voluminous 
 
24  See, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 
441 (2003) (“[N]ational courts face transnational issues with increasing frequency.”).  But see 
Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011) 
(questioning whether, based on currently available empirical evidence, transnational issues are 
increasing in frequency). 
25  See infra Part II.B. 
26  See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1321, 1327 (2001) (categorizing the doctrine as principally about federalism concerns); Paul J. 
Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682 (1974) (same).  But 
see Green, supra note 3, at 615–16 (arguing that Erie had nothing to do with these concerns but was 
instead about enumerated powers). 
27  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965); see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 
U.S. 415, 427–28 (1996) (emphasizing the twin aims in classifying law as either “substantive” or 
“procedural”). 
28  See infra Part III.A.4. 
29  E.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. 
Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of 
Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007). 
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responses,30 only a handful of articles analyze the Erie doctrine from the 
perspective of private international law.31  Therefore, part of what this 
Article seeks to do is evaluate the ongoing debate between Professors Curtis 
Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Harold Koh, and others regarding Erie’s 
application to customary international law, as well as to examine their 
conclusions as applied to private international law cases.32  By proposing a 
new view of the Erie doctrine’s applicability to international conflict-of-
laws cases, this Article fills a gap in the scholarly literature in an area on the 
verge of further development by courts. 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I reviews the present state of 
the Erie doctrine as it relates to conflict of laws.  Part II explores the Erie 
doctrine’s application beyond the domestic context to international conflict-
of-laws cases.  After first explaining changes in conflict-of-laws 
jurisprudence after Erie and Klaxon, Part II examines the Supreme Court’s 
most recent case on the subject, Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner,33 
and then explores the constitutional implications of international conflict of 
laws.  Part III examines whether the explained rationales for the Erie 
doctrine are applicable in international conflict-of-laws cases.  After 
 
30  See e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 
(1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to 
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our 
Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997); 
Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 
371 (2002). 
31  See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United States: In 
Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 280 (1991) (arguing 
that the “tension created by interpreting Erie . . . require[s] reference to state law on a matter primarily 
dealing with foreign commerce and on which the de facto development of the law is in many ways 
indistinguishable from other areas of federal common law”); Daniel C.K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New 
Age of International Law: Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice of Law, 74 IOWA L. 
REV. 165, 166–67 (1988) (“So powerful is Erie’s grip on the American legal imagination that many 
state and federal courts mechanically apply state law even to issues of international choice of law that 
implicate the foreign affairs of the United States.” (footnotes omitted)); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 
Nationalizing International Law: Essay in Honor of Louis Henkin, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 121, 
125–26 (1997) (“[I]f one accepts the vision . . . that recognition of foreign judgments . . . ought to be 
part of the law of nations . . . it seems to me that recognition of foreign judgments should be a question 
of national, not ‘state’ law.”); Spencer Weber Waller, A Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure, 
26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 101, 122 (1993) (“While it is often difficult to determine the precise boundaries 
of the federal domain in other contexts, foreign affairs and foreign commerce are matters that Erie 
leaves untouched.” (footnote omitted)).  Other commentators have addressed this issue from a domestic 
conflict-of-laws perspective.  See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the 
Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 82 (1993); 
Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: A Reevaluation, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 21, 22 (1998); 
Donald T. Trautman, Toward Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1718 (1992).  My 
purpose in this Article is to investigate the Erie doctrine’s application in cases involving international 
conflict of laws. 
32  See infra Part IV. 
33  423 U.S. 3 (1975). 
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showing that Erie’s statutory and constitutional grounds do not constrain 
the federal courts from developing federal conflict-of-laws rules in 
international cases, Part III next focuses on Erie’s twin aims of avoiding 
forum shopping and encouraging equal administration of the law.  After 
presenting and analyzing new empirical data regarding the relationship 
between choice of law and forum non conveniens motions, Part III 
concludes by discussing the appropriate relationship between the Erie 
doctrine and international conflict of laws.  Part IV explores a sounder 
approach that might be applied by U.S. federal courts through a set of 
criteria by which courts might respect the Erie doctrine while developing 
specialized federal common law in international conflict-of-laws cases. 
I. THE ERIE DOCTRINE AND CONFLICT OF LAWS 
To understand the relationship between the Erie doctrine and private 
international law cases, it is necessary to focus precisely on what Erie and 
its progeny require in those cases.34  Under the Rules of Decision Act, the 
substantive laws applied by federal courts sitting in diversity are “[t]he laws 
of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United 
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide.”35  Starting with 
the 1842 case of Swift v. Tyson, the Supreme Court read “the laws of the 
several states” to encompass only state constitutional and statutory law, the 
construction of that law by state courts, and common law matters of “local” 
interest.36  Thus, in cases that did not touch on state positive law and matters 
of a local concern, such as contracts and general commercial law, federal 
courts were free to look beyond a state’s local common law and apply 
general common law.37  In 1938, the Court decided Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, through which it overruled its decision in Swift by announcing 
 
34  By “private international law,” I mean domestic rules concerned with choice of law, jurisdiction 
of courts, and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in cases crossing national borders.  
What is called “conflict of laws” in the United States is known as private international law throughout 
much of the rest of the world.  See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.1 (5th ed. 2010).  In this Article, I will use both terms as coextensive.  
35  28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).  The Rules of Decision Act was originally contained in § 34 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789.  Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (establishing that “the laws of 
the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise 
require or provide” will be the “rules of decision . . . where they apply”).  For clarity, I note that Erie’s 
dictates go beyond diversity jurisdiction.  See In re Exxon Valdez, 484 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]he basis of a federal court’s jurisdiction over a state law claim is irrelevant for Erie purposes.  
‘Where state law supplies the rule of decision, it is the duty of the federal courts to ascertain and apply 
that law.’”). 
36  41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 12–13, 18–19 (1842). 
37  See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 
276 U.S. 518, 529–30 (1928) (“No provision of a state statute or Constitution and no ancient or fixed 
local usage is involved.  For the discovery of common-law principles applicable in any case, 
investigation is not limited to the decisions of the courts of the State in which the controversy arises.”). 
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that “[t]here is no federal general common law.”38  Following Erie, federal 
courts sitting in diversity must apply the law of the state in which they sit, 
be it positive law or common law, unless there is a federal constitutional, 
treaty, or statutory provision that controls.39  After first focusing on what the 
Erie doctrine requires, this Part explains the development of the doctrine 
and its relationship to private international law cases. 
A. Erie: The End of Federal General Common Law 
Harry Tompkins was proceeding along the right-of-way next to a set of 
railroad tracks in Hughestown, Pennsylvania.40  A train passed him, and he 
was struck by “something which looked like a door projecting from one of 
the moving cars.”41  Upon falling, his right arm was crushed under the 
wheels of the train, and it was later amputated.42  Tompkins’s lawyers 
recognized that the case, while solid as to the injuries sustained and the 
ownership of the train in question, presented a complicated question 
regarding the controlling substantive law.43  Proceeding under Pennsylvania 
common law presented a problem because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
had recently held that a person using a path that ran along a railroad’s right-
of-way was a trespasser.44  As such, the railroad owed such a person no duty 
of care other than the duty to avoid reckless and wanton negligence.45  Thus, 
if pled under Pennsylvania common law in a Pennsylvania state court, 
Tompkins’s case would have been doomed. 
Fortunately for Tompkins, he was a citizen of Pennsylvania and the 
Erie Railroad was incorporated in New York.  Tompkins was thus able to 
invoke diversity jurisdiction and bring his suit in federal court.46  By filing 
in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
Tompkins could rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Swift, which 
 
38  304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
39  Id. at 78–79; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 327 (5th ed. 2007).  As noted, the 
Erie doctrine applies beyond diversity cases.  See, e.g., DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 
151 (1983) (noting that the doctrine applies in any situation in which state law is to be applied in federal 
court).  Given that most private international law cases arise under diversity jurisdiction, my focus in 
this Article will be on those cases.  See, e.g., Whytock, supra note 24, at 506 (noting that alienage 
jurisdiction is “a primary basis for subject matter jurisdiction in transnational litigation”). 
40  Erie, 304 U.S. at 69; EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE 
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 95 (2000). 
41  PURCELL, supra note 40. 
42  Id. at 96–97. 
43  For an interesting, illuminating, and entertaining discussion concerning the entire background of 
the case, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and 
Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 21 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 
2008).  For a more complete review of the case in historical perspective, see PURCELL, supra note 40. 
44  Falchetti v. Pa. R.R., 160 A. 859, 860 (Pa. 1932). 
45  Koontz v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 163 A. 212, 214 (Penn. 1932); Falchetti, 160 A. at 860. 
46  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). 
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empowered the federal court to apply general common law as opposed to 
Pennsylvania common law.47  General common law imposed a standard of 
ordinary negligence on the railroad and classified Tompkins as a licensee.48  
Under this standard, Tompkins prevailed in the district court and on appeal 
the Second Circuit affirmed.49  A petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme 
Court followed, and was granted.50 
The question before the Supreme Court in Erie was not whether the 
Court should overrule Swift and remove the ability of federal courts to 
apply general common law to matters not touching local concerns.51  
Indeed, each side believed it could prevail under Swift.  Following his 
success before the lower courts, Tompkins argued that his case was 
governed by general common law.  The Erie Railroad argued that the 
Pennsylvania rule was sufficiently “local” in nature so as to be applied in 
federal court, in line with Swift.52  Nevertheless, the Court reached out to 
resolve “[w]hether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift . . . shall now be 
disapproved.”53 
With the question stated that way, Justice Brandeis answered for the 
Court in the affirmative and gave three grounds for the decision.54  First, 
“recent research of a competent scholar,” Professor Charles Warren, had 
called into question the construction that the Swift Court had given the 
Rules of Decision Act.55  The Court, accepting this view, concluded that the 
unwritten, as well as written, laws of a state qualified as laws under the 
Act.56 
 
47  See Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1937), rev’d, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
48  Id. at 604. 
49  Id. at 606. 
50  Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 302 U.S. 671 (1937). 
51  See Brief on Behalf of Petitioner Erie Railroad Co. at 2–3, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 
(1938) (No. 367), 1938 WL 63879, at *1–3.  Indeed, the Erie Railroad specifically refused to challenge 
Swift.  See id. at 27 (“We do not question the finality of the holding of this Court in Swift . . . that the 
‘laws of the several States’ referred to in the Rules of Decision Act do not include state court decisions 
as such.”). 
52  Id. at 2. 
53  Erie, 304 U.S. at 69. 
54  Id. at 71–80.  While the Erie decision might be examined as an exemplar of legal positivism, I am 
purposefully focusing here on the precise legal reasons given by the Court for its decision.  My reasons 
for so doing are: (1) federal courts tend not to focus on this jurisprudential argument and (2) simply 
reading the case as about positivism perhaps misses the mark.  See Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie 
and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673, 687 (1998) (“The claimed historical 
connection [between legal positivism and the Erie decision] fails to explain why there was a large 
temporal gap between the general acceptance of legal positivism and the decision in Erie.  By itself, this 
gap makes a causal role for positivism seem doubtful.”). 
55  Erie, 304 U.S. at 72–73 (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal 
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 51–52, 81–88, 108 (1923) (arguing, based on evidence of a 
prior draft of the Act that the words “the laws of the several states” meant “the Statute law” as well as 
the “unwritten or common law now in use” of the several states)). 
56  Erie, 304 U.S. at 73–74.  Many have questioned whether Professor Warren’s and the Court’s 
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Second, as a matter of policy, the Swift rule had prevented the very 
uniformity it sought to achieve.  As the Court explained, “[p]ersistence of 
state courts in their own opinions on questions of common law prevented 
uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of 
demarcation between the province of general law and that of local law 
developed a new well of uncertainties.”57  In addition, the ability to forum 
shop under the Swift rule inappropriately gave nonresident plaintiffs an 
advantage over resident defendants.58  A nonresident plaintiff suing a 
resident defendant could forum shop between state court and federal court 
to find the substantive law most favorable to his case, as Tompkins did.  By 
contrast, although a resident plaintiff suing a nonresident defendant could 
similarly forum shop between state and federal court, if the resident plaintiff 
brought suit in state court, the nonresident defendant could remove the suit 
to federal court.59  Thus, resident defendants sued by nonresident plaintiffs 
might be forced into not only a particular forum but might also face 
unfavorable substantive law.  As one leading commentator has noted, this 
was “[w]ithout a doubt[] the strongest argument for overruling Swift” 
because “it was unjust that the result in a case depended on the citizenship 
of the parties.”60 
The third and final ground the Court relied upon was one of 
constitutional dimension.  “Except in matters governed by the Federal 
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the 
law of the state . . . whether . . . declared by its Legislature in a statute or by 
its highest court in a decision . . . .”61  This was so because “no clause in the 
Constitution purports to confer” the power to create substantive rules of 
common law “upon the federal courts.”62  In other words, because Congress 
has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable to the 
states, the federal courts similarly have no power.63 
 
conclusion was correct.  See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1514–15 (1984) 
(“[Professor Warren’s] conclusion is too broad.  Local common, or judge-made, law . . . clearly came 
within the command of the section.  But general common law . . . did not come within the scope either 
of section 34 or of the lex loci principle from which the section was derived.”); Henry J. Friendly, In 
Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 389 (1964) (“Warren’s 
conclusion could thus be reached only by an argument, contrary to the one he made, that the change 
from the original draft was not simply stylistic but had a substantive purpose as well.”). 
57  Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 (footnote omitted). 
58  Id. at 74–75. 
59  See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006) (permitting a nonresident defendant, but not a resident defendant, 
sued by a nonresident plaintiff to remove a case filed in state court to federal court). 
60  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 325. 
61  Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
62  Id. 
63  See Friendly, supra note 56, at 395 (noting that “it would be . . . unreasonable to suppose that the 
federal courts have a law-making power which the federal legislature does not”). 
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There has been voluminous debate concerning all three rationales for 
the Erie decision.64  While scholars have focused on historical evidence 
used in the decision65 and Erie’s constitutional source,66 my primary focus is 
on the Court’s second rationale—uniformity in the law.  The reason for this 
is that, for better or worse, it is now well established that Erie is here to stay 
as a constitutional or statutory case.67  Indeed, no current Justice on the 
Supreme Court has given any hint of a willingness to reconsider or question 
the doctrine.  In the 2009 Term, for instance, the Supreme Court faithfully 
applied the first and third Erie rationales without objection.68  At the risk of 
a bad pun, for purposes of Erie’s statutory and constitutional rationales, that 
train has left the station, at least as far as the courts are concerned. 
By contrast, courts still grapple with the second Erie rationale in cases 
where a federal statute, a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, or some other 
federal rule does not resolve the case.  In such cases, a court is left with “the 
typical, relatively unguided Erie choice”69 that requires a court to assess the 
state rule in light of Erie’s twin aims of “discouragement of forum-
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”70  
Indeed, these are the precise aims on which the Court has rested the Erie 
doctrine’s application to conflict-of-laws cases.71  The fact that the Erie 
doctrine can be viewed as concerned with these twin aims provides 
important context for the Court’s decision in Klaxon, which is discussed in 
the next section. 
 
64  See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 321–31 (discussing a collection of sources to 
explain the debate). 
65  See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES 626–28 (1953); 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 866–71 (1953) (examining the history of the 
first judiciary act); Friendly, supra note 56, at 388–89 (“If, as Brandeis said, ‘the more recent research of 
a competent scholar, who examined the original document . . . [had] established’ that the narrower 
construction theretofore given the Rules of Decision Act ‘by the Court was erroneous . . . ,’ why was 
that not enough?” (omissions and alteration in original) (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 72)). 
66  See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (2007) 
(noting that “Erie rests on ‘constitutional principles which restrain the power of the federal courts to 
intrude upon the states’ determination of substantive policy in areas which the Constitution and 
Congress have left to state competence’”); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 
133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231, 1312 (1985) (“[T]he flaw in the pre-Erie federal system was the interference 
by federal authorities in matters that the Constitution left to the states . . . .  The vice was not that federal 
courts were engaged in the making of common law, but rather that federal courts were exercising an 
authority that Congress had not the power to grant them.”). 
67  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 327. 
68  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (holding that a state 
may foreclose class action aggregation of state law claims in federal court). 
69  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
70  Id. at 468. 
71  See infra Part I.B. 
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B. Klaxon: Erie’s Relationship to Conflict of Laws 
Prior to Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,72 federal 
courts held that Swiftian general common law also encompassed 
determinations of conflict of laws.73  As such, federal courts were free to 
develop their own conflict-of-laws rules in diversity cases.  Like the choice 
of substantive law in Erie, this has tremendous impact on a case.  To return 
to the facts of Erie, Tompkins’s accident occurred in Pennsylvania, but he 
brought suit in diversity in New York.  Post-Erie, it was established that the 
federal district court must apply the laws of the forum state.  But does that 
mean that New York conflict-of-laws rules should also be applied, which 
might direct a New York court, and thus the federal district court, to apply 
Pennsylvania law?74  If post-Erie courts retained the ability to apply general 
common law to conflict-of-laws decisions, then a federal district court 
could still disregard the laws of a forum state through application of 
conflicts rules permitting it to apply another state’s law.75  Klaxon illustrates 
this dilemma. 
In Klaxon, suit was brought in Delaware federal district court on a 
contract that was executed and mainly performed in New York.76  A jury 
awarded the plaintiff $100,000 and judgment was entered.77  The plaintiff 
then moved to add prejudgment interest based on New York law, which 
was granted.78  On appeal, the Third Circuit held that New York and not 
Delaware law was applicable because “it is clear by what we think is 
undoubtedly the better view of the law that the rules for ascertaining the 
measure of damages are not a matter of procedure at all, but are matters of 
substance which should be settled by reference to the law of the appropriate 
state according to the type of case being tried in the forum.”79 
The case presented a new issue to the Court.  Erie requires the 
application of the law of the state in which the federal district court sits.80  
In cases that arise solely within a state, the answer is clear: the law of the 
 
72  313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
73  See, e.g., Dygert v. Vt. Loan & Trust Co., 94 F. 913, 915 (9th Cir. 1899) (illustrating a court 
using common law to develop conflict of laws). 
74  Friendly, supra note 56, at 401 (noting that “counsel were agreed that if state law controlled, 
Pennsylvania law would govern”).  Or, another law might control.  See Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine 
and the Constitution: II, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 598 (1958) (noting that a New York court using its own 
choice-of-law rules would not necessarily follow the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts).  
Interestingly, this question was glossed over by the Erie Court.  See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 
71 (1938) (assuming Pennsylvania’s common law applied). 
75  See, e.g., Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940) (developing the argument in full). 
76  Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 494. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. at 494–95. 
79  Id. at 495–96 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
80  Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938). 
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state in which the court sits applies.81  If a case, however, has contacts with 
multiple states, the question is whether the federal district court must apply 
the law of the state in which it sits, all the way down to the precise conflict-
of-laws rules of the state, or whether the federal court may invoke general 
common law to determine which state’s law should apply. 
The Supreme Court resolved this dilemma in a single paragraph, and 
held that Erie’s prohibition 
against such independent determinations by the federal courts extends to the 
field of conflict of laws. . . . Otherwise the accident of diversity of citizenship 
would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and 
federal courts sitting side by side. . . . Any other ruling would do violence to 
the principle of uniformity within a state upon which the [Erie] decision is 
based.82 
Furthermore, according to the Court, “[i]t is not for the federal courts to 
thwart . . . local policies by enforcing an independent ‘general law’ of 
conflict of laws.”83  As such, the case was remanded with instructions to 
apply the law of Delaware. 
Klaxon does not appear to be constitutionally compelled.84  This is 
perhaps why the Court accentuated in its rationale the Erie doctrine’s 
concern with discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of 
inequitable administration of the laws.85  Interestingly, the approach of 
Klaxon and Erie might lead to uniform application of law within a state but 
nonuniform application of law between federal courts of different states.  
Likewise, given that there are not uniform conflict-of-laws rules between 
the several states, this approach could lead to forum shopping between 
states.86  Knowing that federal courts must apply the same conflict-of-laws 
rules as the state courts in which they sit, parties will understandably forum 
shop among federal courts to find the state conflict-of-laws principles that 
will lead to the application of the most favorable substantive law.87 
 
81  Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 495. 
82  Id. at 496. 
83  Id. 
84  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc., 285 F.3d 630, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that Klaxon is 
not based on the Constitution); see also Friendly, supra note 56, at 402 (“[I]n my view, the 
constitutional basis of Erie does not apply to choice of law issues even when diversity is the sole basis 
of federal jurisdiction and a fortiori when it is not.”). 
85  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
86  See, e.g., Chow, supra note 31, at 179 n.69 (noting that “by requiring uniformity between federal 
and state courts on any conflicts issue, Klaxon eliminates the possibility of forum shopping between 
state and federal courts, but at the same time, creates the possibility of forum shopping between different 
states”). 
87  See Borchers, supra note 31, at 121 (arguing that a modern “tendency to allow state courts to 
apply forum law . . . coupled with an easing of the constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction that 
began in 1945[] means that plaintiffs have a strong incentive, and the ability, to engage in interstate 
forum shopping” (footnote omitted)). 
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This is particularly problematic today.  Given that the majority of 
states use conflict-of-laws rules that allow them to apply forum law88 and 
that loosened standards for acquiring personal jurisdiction often provide 
many potential fora in which to sue,89 parties are allowed to forum shop 
their way to the most favorable substantive law.90  Notwithstanding these 
policy problems, the Court has favored parity between federal courts sitting 
within a state and that state’s forum courts over the creation of a federal 
common law of conflicts law that would prevent forum shopping between 
federal courts.91  It also determined that such a result was part of “our 
federal system which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the 
Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its 
neighbors.”92 
The Court’s statement about constitutional limitations will become key 
in the context of the Erie doctrine’s application to international cases 
raising conflict-of-laws issues.  In fact, many international cases stretch the 
bounds of a state’s constitutional authority to adjudicate.93  Furthermore, 
many international cases are surely not matters of “local policy,” but rather 
are cases that touch on national policies.94  Thus, there is room under these 
cases to develop limited federal common law in cases involving 
international conflict of laws.  I will return to these arguments after 
exploring Erie’s international dimensions,95 which is the subject of Part II. 
II. ERIE GOES INTERNATIONAL 
This Part focuses on the application of the Erie doctrine to 
international conflict-of-laws cases.  After first explaining the changes in 
conflict-of-laws thought that occurred after Erie and Klaxon were decided, 
this Part examines the Supreme Court’s most recent case on the subject.  It 
 
88   HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 34, § 1.10 tbl.3. 
89  See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
90  Cf. Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 80 TUL. L. 
REV. 1723, 1724 (2006) (“[The Class Action Fairness Act’s] legislative history is replete with evidence 
of concern over aggressive state choice-of-law practices that can result in the application of a single 
state’s law in a multistate or nationwide class suit.”). 
91  See Harold W. Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 1191, 1194 (1967). 
92  Id. at 1192. 
93  See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 
449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981). 
94  See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
489, 513 (1954) (“Why is it an offense to the ideals of federalism for federal courts to administer, 
between citizens of different states, a juster justice than state courts . . . ?  Was Hamilton wrong in 
saying that the assurance of the due administration of justice to out-of-state citizens is one of the great 
bonds of federal union?”). 
95  See infra Part IV. 
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then explores the constitutional implications of international conflict of 
laws. 
A. Klaxon and International Conflict of Laws 
Klaxon was decided in the 1940s and the Supreme Court made 
reference to it with approval in both the 1950s and 1960s.96  During this 
time, however, the entire field of conflict of laws underwent a revolution 
that changed the way courts and scholars viewed conflict-of-laws cases.97  
At the time Erie and Klaxon were decided in 1938 and 1941, respectively, 
conflict-of-laws analysis was generally mechanical.  Under the First 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, courts applied relatively strict 
jurisdiction-selecting rules that focused on identifying a last-triggering 
event in a factual situation to determine which state’s substantive law would 
be applied to a given case.98  For example, returning to Erie’s facts, the 
general jurisdiction-selecting rule for torts cases was to apply the law of the 
place in which the wrong occurred.99  Given that Tompkins was injured in 
Pennsylvania, under the First Restatement, Pennsylvania’s substantive law 
would be applied to Tompkins’s case, wherever it was filed.100  The 
rationale for this was that when Tompkins was injured in Pennsylvania, a 
right vested that he carried with him regardless of the jurisdiction in which 
he filed suit.101  Assuming New York conflict-of-laws rules followed the 
First Restatement for actions sounding in tort,102 the New York federal 
district court under Erie and Klaxon would be required to apply the 
substantive law of Pennsylvania because that is what the New York state 
courts would have done.103 
 
96  Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 628 (1964); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 
198, 205 (1956).  For purposes of completeness, I note that the Erie and Klaxon rules also apply to state-
law claims heard in a federal question case through the exercise of pendent or supplemental jurisdiction.  
See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (Erie); Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. 
Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 805 F.2d 663, 681 (7th Cir. 1986) (Klaxon). 
97  See generally SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE 1 (2006) (discussing the “phenomenon” referred to as a “‘revolution’ in . . . the 
law of conflict of laws in the United States”). 
98  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934) (withdrawn 
1971) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FIRST)] (“The place of wrong is in the state where the last event 
necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.”); id. § 378 (“The law of the place of 
wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.”); see generally JOSEPH H. BEALE, A 
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) (explaining in detail the First Restatement approach to 
torts and other substantive areas of law). 
99  RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 98, § 377. 
100  Id. 
101  See, e.g., 1 BEALE, supra note 98, § 8A.8 (noting that “the chief task of the Conflict of Laws [is] 
to determine the place where a right arose” and which law created it). 
102  RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 98, §§ 377–378. 
103  See supra note 74. 
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Under this mechanical formulation, judges were prevented from 
exercising discretion to impose their views on state substantive law through 
the choice-of-law process.104  Furthermore, when Erie and Klaxon were 
decided, conflict-of-laws approaches throughout the United States had 
coalesced around the widely accepted First Restatement,105 which meant 
that there was little difference from forum to forum as to which state’s 
substantive law should govern.106  Therefore, it would not matter if 
Tompkins filed his case in a New York or New Jersey federal district court 
because under the First Restatement all federal courts would be required 
under the Erie/Klaxon rule to apply Pennsylvania state substantive law to 
the case.  Viewed in this light, there was little incentive for a plaintiff like 
Tompkins to forum shop because “[a]s long as the rules [of the First 
Restatement were] applied consistently, the same substantive law should 
apply to identical facts, resulting in identical outcomes” no matter where the 
case was filed.107 
Because conflict-of-laws rules in the several states had reached a level 
of uniformity, the Court’s decision in Klaxon made sense.  The Klaxon rule 
prevented someone in Tompkins’s shoes from forum shopping in hopes of 
finding more favorable substantive law not through general common law—
which Erie circumscribed—but through the conflict-of-laws process—
which Klaxon confined.  Thus, the Klaxon rule did much to encourage the 
equal administration of justice and prevent forum shopping.108 
By the middle of the twentieth century, however, this mechanical view 
of conflict of laws had been rejected.109  In addition to being challenged on 
intellectual grounds,110 the First Restatement approach was challenged on 
 
104  See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Corp., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (“We are of opinion that 
the prohibition declared in Erie . . . against . . . independent determinations by the federal courts[] 
extends to the field of conflict of laws. . . .  Otherwise the accident of diversity of citizenship would 
constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by 
side.”). 
105  Borchers, supra note 31, at 120. 
106  For instance, in tort cases the place of injury would govern.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 
98, §§ 377–78.  In contracts cases, the place of acceptance would govern.  Id. §§ 311, 332.  No matter 
what forum was chosen, therefore, the applicable substantive law would be the same. 
107  Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum Shopping: 
Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1374 (2004).  But see Friedrich K. 
Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 559 (1989) (noting that 
escape devices might permit judges to deviate from these clear and consistent rules). 
108  See Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496. 
109  See Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and 
Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1087–88 (1956) (noting that by the 
middle of the twentieth century “the theory of ‘vested rights’ ha[d] been brutally murdered”). 
110  The legal realists argued that Beale’s approach substituted an artificial, metaphysical theory of 
vested rights as a cover for what the courts actually did in cases.  See, e.g., David F. Cavers, A Critique 
of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 181 (1933) (criticizing the theoretical 
justifications for the vested rights approach); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the 
Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736, 746 (1924) (same). 
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practical grounds.  Under the First Restatement, the way in which the 
substantive law applied to a case depended on how the court characterized 
the problem—as a tort, contract, etc.  Yet, the First Restatement did not 
precisely detail how such characterizations were to be made by the courts.111  
So, for instance, a court might characterize a case sounding in tort as one 
sounding in contract in order to escape what it viewed as inappropriate 
substantive tort law.112 
To return yet again to poor Tompkins’s case, if he could convince the 
court (or if the court convinced itself) that his case was not a case sounding 
in tort (therefore implicating Pennsylvania law), but instead was one 
sounding in contract and therefore implicating another state’s law,113 
Tompkins might have been able to encourage the court to apply the more 
favorable substantive law of another state.  Thus, the possibility that a court 
might characterize a factual scenario under one or another of the First 
Restatement’s various substantive doctrines in order to apply substantive 
law that it deemed to reach a better result—so called “escape devices”114—
defeated the primary benefit of the vested rights doctrine, which was 
consistency of application.115 
Because of these problems, when Erie’s relationship to conflict of laws 
again came before the Court in the 1970s, the leading conflict-of-laws 
approach was no longer the vested rights doctrine but was instead interest 
analysis doctrine.116  Rather than relying on mechanistic rules susceptible to 
judicial manipulation, interest analysis generally focused on the question of 
whether a state had an interest in the outcome of a dispute that would justify 
the application of its law  to the case.117  The issue before the Court in Day 
 
111  See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 65[b][1] (3d ed. 2002). 
112  See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels’ U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163 (Conn. 1928); Cortes v. Ryder 
Truck Rental, Inc. 581 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). 
113  While torts were governed by the place of injury, RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 98, §§ 377–
78, contracts were generally governed under the First Restatement by the place of contracting, id. 
§§ 311, 332.  Assuming New York’s substantive law was better for his case, Tompkins would have to 
argue that there was a contractual relationship with the Erie Railroad entered into in New York.  Lurking 
behind this creative manipulation is, of course, the similar manipulation of law that the Erie Court 
sought to curb by limiting a federal district court’s ability to engage in general common law.  See Erie 
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
114  RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 111, § 65[b][1]; see also HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, 
supra note 34, §§ 3.4–3.5 (discussing this practice). 
115  See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE 
L.J. 457, 464 (1924) (“What each [state] will do [in a conflict-of-laws scenario] will depend solely upon 
its own positive law . . . and not upon any inherent principles of ‘jurisdiction’ limiting its powers.  Its 
choice . . . will . . . be purely pragmatic—as to what, all things considered, it is desirable to do.”). 
116  See Linda J. Silberman, Commentary, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
33, 80 n.259 (1978) (describing interest analysis around this time as the “dominant mode of analysis in 
modern choice of law theory”); see generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT 
OF LAWS 188–282 (1963) (setting out the theory of interest analysis). 
117  CURRIE, supra note 116, at 183–84. 
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& Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner was whether Klaxon would be moderated 
to take account of this change in conflict-of-laws thought.118 
The facts of Day illustrate the problem.  During the Vietnam War, a 
howitzer round that was manufactured in Texas prematurely exploded in 
Cambodia, injuring a solider from Wisconsin and killing a soldier from 
Tennessee.119  The injured soldier brought a diversity suit against the 
manufacturer in Texas.120  The question before the court was which law was 
to be applied.  The choice of substantive law mattered because Cambodian 
law would require proof of fault, whereas Texas, Wisconsin, Tennessee, 
and Pennsylvania law, the other relevant jurisdictions with connections to 
the case, applied strict liability.121  The district court applied the substantive 
law of Texas under Erie and the conflict-of-laws rules of Texas under 
Klaxon.122  Concluding that similarly situated Texas courts would have 
applied the law of the place of injury, the district court applied Cambodian 
law.123 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held, consistent with interest analysis, that 
Cambodia had no interest in the case because it “is indifferent to the 
protection of American manufacturers.”124  As such, the court reasoned that 
[t]his is a case in which the policies of all jurisdictions having an interest in the 
dispute will be carried out through application of Texas [substantive] law. . . . 
However controlling state law may be in most diversity cases, it does not 
extend so far as to bind a federal court to the law of a wholly disinterested 
jurisdiction.125 
The Fifth Circuit disregarded the state conflict-of-laws rules of Texas, 
finding that Cambodia had no interest in the case, and instead opted for a 
conflict-of-laws methodology of its own that directed the court to apply 
forum (Texas) substantive law, which permitted recovery.126 
The Supreme Court reversed in a short per curiam opinion, without 
hearing oral argument.127  The Court stated that the Fifth Circuit either 
“misinterpreted our longstanding decision in Klaxon . . . or else determined 
for itself that [Klaxon] was no longer of controlling force in a case such as 
 
118  423 U.S. 3, 3–4 (1975). 
119  Id. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. 
123  Id.  The district court was correct as a matter of Texas conflicts law.  On remand, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that, at the time the case was tried, the Supreme Court of Texas would have applied 
Cambodian law.  Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 546 F.2d 26, 26 (5th Cir. 1977). 
124  Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 512 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S. 3 
(1975). 
125  Id. at 80–81. 
126  Id. at 81. 
127  Day, 423 U.S. at 4. 
105:1531  (2011) When Erie Goes International  
 1549
this.”128  The Court thus reaffirmed that under the Erie doctrine, federal 
courts sitting in diversity must apply the law of the state in which they sit, 
including that state’s conflict-of-laws rules,129 even when those rules direct 
the court to apply foreign law.130 
B. International Conflict of Laws and the Constitution 
There is an important wrinkle to this international conflict-of-laws 
analysis that has received little sustained attention:131 state conflict-of-laws 
rules must be applied so that those rules are “within the limits permitted by 
the Constitution.”132  It is important to remember that Klaxon was decided 
when the dominant conflict-of-laws methodology focused on the 
jurisdiction where a particular event occurred.133  Under this method, a state 
court applying its conflict-of-laws rules would focus on an act—such as the 
place of injury in a tort case—to localize the jurisdiction whose law should 
be applied in a given case.134  Such an approach sought to find the one 
 
128  Id. 
129  While Klaxon speaks to diversity cases, its logic has been expanded to include pendent 
jurisdiction over state claims as well.  See e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 
726 (1966) (advising federal courts to use careful discretion before exercising jurisdiction over state 
claims).  While the focus of this Article is on diversity cases, different conflict-of-laws rules may be 
used in federal question contexts.  In particular, federal common law conflict-of-laws rules may be 
applied, as opposed to state conflict-of-laws rules, in federal question cases.  See GARY B. BORN & 
PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 749–50 (4th ed. 
2007) (noting the possibility of applying federal common law in federal question cases). 
130  See, e.g., Abogados v. AT&T, Inc., 223 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Mexican law); 
Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 174 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 1999) (also applying Mexican law).  Many 
circuit courts have found that if the laws in question do not conflict, then a conflict-of-laws analysis is 
unnecessary and the federal court may apply the law of the forum state.  See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Kamrath, 475 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2007) (“We need not decide whether Missouri law or New 
York law applies in this case because the outcome would be the same under either law.”); Lambert v. 
Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1115 (1st Cir. 1993) (also stating the conflict-of-laws analysis is unnecessary); In 
re Complaint of Bankers Trust Co., 752 F.2d 874, 882 (3d Cir. 1984, as amended 1985) (same).  But see 
Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 462 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Choice of law analysis is 
necessary because Berg’s claim is more likely to fail under Pennsylvania law.”). 
131  For one of the rare exceptions, see Ayelet Ben-Ezer & Ariel L. Bendor, Conceptualizing Yahoo! 
v. L.C.R.A.: Private Law, Constitutional Review, and International Conflict of Laws, 25 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2089, 2092–93 (2004) (“[U]ntil recent years, private international law was an island, detached 
from constitutional considerations in general, and from those related to constitutional review in 
particular.  But times have changed.  [G]lobalization has increased the importance of questions 
concerning the enforcement of foreign judgments and the laws of foreign nations.” (footnote omitted)).  
For a related look at the constitutional implications for enforcement of foreign judgments, see generally 
Montré D. Carodine, Political Judging: When Due Process Goes International, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1159 (2007). 
132  Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Corp., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
133  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 98, § 42 (“As used in the Restatement of this 
Subject, the word ‘jurisdiction’ means the power of a state to create interests which under the principles 
of the common law will be recognized as valid in other states.”). 
134  Id. § 377. 
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territorial sovereign whose law required application as a matter of 
jurisdiction.135  This was because the first question for purposes of the First 
Restatement was to determine the one jurisdiction that produced a vested 
right.136  In so doing, this approach amounted to a constitutional exercise of 
state jurisdiction,137 because by virtue of a state having a significant 
territorial contact with a case, such as being the place of injury in a tort 
case, the application of that state’s law would be constitutional.138 
As courts moved away from a rigidly territorial approach to conflict of 
laws, various constitutional issues were raised.139  An important gloss on the 
constitutional limitations imposed on states when applying modern conflict-
of-laws methodologies was supplied by the Court in Allstate Insurance Co. 
v. Hague.140 
 
135  See id. § 6 (“The rules of Conflict of Laws of a state are not affected by the attitude of another 
state toward rights or other interests created in the former state.”). 
136  See, e.g., 2 BEALE, supra note 98, § 377.2 (explaining the approach in the context of torts). 
137  See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 483, 562 (1997) (“Prior to the 1930 case of Home Insurance Co[.] v Dick, the predominant 
territorial-vested-rights theory of Joseph Beale’s First Restatement had been virtually constitutionalized 
by the Supreme Court, under the rubric of the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses.” (footnote 
omitted)); Ralf Michaels, The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607, 1631 
(2008) (“Shortly after its case law regarding the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court began to apply 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause for choice of law as a duty to recognize foreign law—first as a strict 
duty to apply foreign law, and later as a duty to balance the regulatory interests of the various states.”). 
138  See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (suggesting that the place of injury rule 
was required by the Constitution); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 545–46 (1914) (same); 
see also Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1635 (2005) 
(noting that the place of injury “seemed a significant contact in a tort case”). 
139  See, e.g., James A. Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 
185, 185–86 (1976) (“Other [constitutional clauses] have been used . . . to provide limitations on a 
state’s choice of law.  These include the commerce clause, the privileges and immunities clause . . . and 
the equal protection clause.  However, the only provisions successfully invoked with any regularity are 
the due process and the full faith and credit clauses.” (footnotes omitted)); Kermit Roosevelt III, The 
Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2503 (1999) (“If the ‘choice-of-
law’ question is conceived of in terms of interstate recognition of rights . . . it becomes immediately 
apparent that the Constitution has obvious relevance.  The problem is how to accommodate both local 
and federal aspects of the issue.”). 
140  449 U.S. 302 (1981).  There were various precursors to the Court’s modern analysis of the 
relationship between conflict of laws and the Constitution.  See, e.g., Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v Indus. 
Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939) (“[T]he very nature of the federal union of states, to which 
are reserved some of the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause as 
the means for compelling a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with 
a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.”); Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. 
Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 540–41 (1935) (noting that while the Due Process Clause prevents a 
state from restricting or controlling contracts entered into and to be performed outside of the state, the 
Constitution does not forbid a state from exercising control over a contract entered into in that state but 
intended to be performed elsewhere); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 375–78 (1918) 
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of contract prevented a Missouri court 
from applying one of that state’s statutes to invalidate a contract validly entered into in New York and 
governed by that state’s law). 
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The plaintiff’s husband, Ralph Hague, was killed in Wisconsin when a 
motorcycle on which he was a passenger was hit by a car.141  The drivers of 
both cars were Wisconsin residents, as was Mr. Hague, who worked in 
Minnesota, just across the Wisconsin state line.142  After the accident, the 
plaintiff moved to Minnesota, where she remarried, and a Minnesota 
probate judge appointed her administrator of her deceased husband’s 
estate.143  While none of the operators of the vehicles involved had 
insurance, Mr. Hague had three policies, each for $15,000, which included 
uninsured motorist coverage.144  Mrs. Hague sued Allstate in Minnesota 
state court “seeking a declaration under Minnesota law that the $15,000 
uninsured motorist coverage on each of her husband’s three automobiles 
could be ‘stacked’ to provide a total coverage of $45,000.”145  Although the 
Minnesota trial court agreed that Wisconsin law prevented stacking, it 
entered summary judgment for the plaintiff because “Minnesota choice-of-
law rules required the application of Minnesota law permitting stacking” 
and the anti-stacking rule was “inimical to the public policy of 
Minnesota.”146  The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed.147 
The sole issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether a 
Minnesota state court’s choice to apply Minnesota law to the case was 
constitutional.148  While the Court recognized in a sharply divided plurality 
opinion written by Justice Brennan that more than one state’s law could be 
applied to controversies with multistate contacts, it announced that the 
Constitution requires that a “[s]tate must have a significant contact or 
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that the 
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”149  The 
Court did not make it totally clear in what circumstances state interests 
would be created.  On the facts of the case, the Court simply found it 
enough that Mr. Hague was a member of the Minnesota workforce, that 
Allstate was present and doing business in Minnesota, and that Mrs. Hague 
entered Minnesota prior to beginning the litigation.150  Given this rule and 
the contacts with the state of Minnesota, the Court concluded that the 
application of Minnesota law did not violate the Constitution.151 
 
141  Allstate, 449 U.S. at 305. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. 
146  Id. at 306. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. at 307. 
149  Id. at 313. 
150  Id. at 313–19. 
151  Id. at 320. 
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Thus, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that in order to comport 
with the Constitution, a state must have some significant interest in the 
application of its law to the facts of a case.  It need not be the only state 
with an interest, or even the state with the most significant interest; just a 
state with a significant connection to the case to make the application of its 
law constitutional.152 
Four years after Allstate, the Court applied this rule to invalidate a state 
court’s choice of law in the case of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.153  That 
case involved a class action consisting of approximately 28,000 members 
who owned land in eleven states.154  The class action was brought in Kansas 
state court.155  Less than 3% of the plaintiffs and 1% of the leases at issue in 
the case had any “apparent connection to the State of Kansas.156  
Nevertheless, the Kansas state courts “applied Kansas contract and Kansas 
equity law to every claim in th[e] case.”157 
Speaking for the Court, then-Justice Rehnquist applied the Allstate test.  
First, a court must consider whether there is a conflict between the laws 
competing for application.158  Were there no conflict between the laws of 
Kansas and Texas (the laws competing for application), “[t]here c[ould] be 
no injury in applying Kansas law.”159  Finding a conflict between these 
laws, Justice Rehnquist relied on Allstate to explain that, “for a State’s 
substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that 
State must have a significant contact or a significant aggregation of 
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither 
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”160  Finding few significant contacts 
with Kansas supporting the application of its law to all claimants, the Court 
concluded “that application of Kansas law to every claim in this case is 
sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits.”161 
 
152  HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 34, § 3.23. 
153  472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
154  Id. at 799. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. at 815. 
157  Id. at 814. 
158  Id. at 816. 
159  Id. 
160  Id. at 818–19 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
161  Id. at 822.  To be clear, the Supreme Court has been less than pellucid regarding whether the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due Process Clause, or both, constrain choice of law.  See, e.g., 
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) (full faith and credit); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 
281 U.S. 397 (1930) (due process).  It appears, however, that this is a distinction without a difference, 
for the Court views the clauses as imposing similar requirements.  See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 
U.S. 717, 729 n.3 (1988); id. at 735 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 
302, 308 (1981).  In any event and for the purposes of this Article’s emphasis on foreign law, the Due 
Process Clause is the only relevant clause, because the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to 
laws beyond the several states.  See id. at 322 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, of course, was inapplicable in Home Ins. Co. because the law of a foreign nation, rather than of a 
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These cases should be viewed in light of Home Insurance Co. v. 
Dick,162 the Court’s only case involving the constitutional relationship 
between international conflict of laws and state choice of law.163  As with 
Erie and Klaxon, Dick was decided when mechanistic choice of law was in 
its heyday.  In Dick, the plaintiff brought suit in a Texas state court against 
three companies: one Mexican insurance company that had insured his 
tugboat while in Mexican waters and two New York companies that had 
reinsured the original Mexican insurer.164  On account of a fire, the plaintiff 
sought recovery for the loss of his tugboat.  The defendants moved to 
dismiss, asserting that the action had not been filed according to a clause in 
the insurance contract, valid under Mexican law, that required suit to be 
brought within one year.165  The plaintiff argued that the policy’s limitations 
period was invalid under Texas law, which set a two-year limitations 
period.166  The Texas state courts agreed with the plaintiff, allowing the case 
to go forward under the Texas statute of limitations.167 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Texas 
court’s rejection of the contract terms, valid in Mexico, violated due 
process.168  In the Court’s view, 
nothing in any way relating to the policy sued on, or to the contracts of 
reinsurance, was done or required to be done in Texas.  All acts relating to the 
making of the policy were done in Mexico.  All acts in relation to the making 
of the contracts of re-insurance were done there or in New York.169 
Because of this, Texas lacked the constitutional “power to affect the 
terms of the contracts so made”170 because Texas was without the power to 
affect “the rights of parties beyond its borders having no relations to 
anything done or to be done within them.”171  Appearing to embrace the 
territorial conflict-of-laws rules of the First Restatement, the Court rejected 
the application of Texas law.172 
 
sister State, was at issue . . . .”). 
162  281 U.S. 397 (1930). 
163  See Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International 
Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 296 n.6 (noting that the “due process standards applied to state 
international choice of law come from the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
164  Dick, 281 U.S. at 402. 
165  Id. at 403. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. at 405. 
168  Id. at 407–10. 
169  Id. at 408. 
170  Id. 
171  Cf. id. at 410 (limiting the Texas courts’ power as a policy consideration). 
172  See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Who Was Dick? Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law, 
1998 UTAH L. REV. 37, 44. 
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Read in light of Allstate and Shutts, however, Dick now seems to stand 
for the proposition that a state may not apply its law unless it has a 
significant contact with the case.173  The Constitution, in other words, does 
not require the application of a foreign state’s law.  State courts, and thus 
federal courts applying state conflict-of-laws rules under Klaxon and Day, 
are not constitutionally required to apply foreign law so long as the 
application of another law (even forum law) evinces “a significant contact 
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that 
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”174 
Importantly, these cases dealt only with the ability of state courts to 
apply their own laws to certain factual scenarios.  Based on the Court’s 
reasoning, it nonetheless seems clear that since a state court cannot apply 
forum law unless it comports with the Constitution, a federal court sitting in 
diversity may similarly not do so.  Likewise, because a state court must 
apply law “in a constitutionally permissible manner,” it should also be true 
that a state court may not apply the law of another forum, and neither may a 
federal district court, unless that forum would meet this test.175  It should 
also be the case that these decisions apply in cases where a forum court is 
applying foreign law.176  Foreign law cannot be applied by either a state or 
federal court unless it is constitutional to do so.177 
At bottom, the mechanical application of a state’s conflict-of-laws 
rules by a federal district court is constrained by the Constitution.  The 
uncritical application of state conflict-of-laws rules that direct the court to 
apply foreign law is thus fraught with constitutional difficulties, including 
whether the application of foreign law would violate U.S. due process limits 
on legislative jurisdiction.178  In light of this, courts should question the 
mechanistic application of the Erie doctrine in private international law 
cases.  Before explaining in greater detail what a new approach would look 
like, Part III examines the rationales for applying the Erie doctrine in 
international cases. 
III. INTERNATIONALIZING ERIE 
By way of review, it is beyond doubt that the Erie doctrine requires a 
federal court sitting in diversity to apply the law of the state in which it 
 
173  See HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 34, §§ 3.21, 3.26, 3.48; Louise Weinberg, 
Choosing Law: The Limitations Debates, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 694. 
174  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981); cf. Gene R. Shreve, Interest Analysis as 
Constitutional Law, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 51, 68–69 (1987) (arguing that interest analysis in choice-of-law 
decisions in which courts decide which state’s law to apply “should not be constitutionally required”). 
175  HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 34, § 3.48 (quoting Hague, 449 U.S. at 313 
(quotation marks omitted)). 
176  See id. 
177  See id. 
178  BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 129, at 422. 
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sits.179  The reasons for this are constitutional, statutory, and policy 
driven.180  Courts are similarly required under Klaxon to apply the conflict-
of-laws rules of the state in which they sit.181  The reasons for this are to 
prevent an end-run around the dictates of Erie and for the same policy 
reasons as those laid out in Erie: to prevent forum shopping and to 
encourage equal administration of the law.182  Evaluating whether these 
rationales are correct or even persuasive in the domestic context is not my 
purpose here, for the federal courts do not question the continuing relevance 
of Erie to their domestic analyses.183 
My purpose in this Part is to instead examine whether these rationales 
apply in the international context.  After showing that Erie’s statutory and 
constitutional grounds do not constrain the ability of a federal court to 
develop federal conflict-of-laws rules in international cases, I next focus on 
the twin aims of Erie: avoiding forum shopping and encouraging equal 
administration of the law.  The discussion of forum shopping uncovers a 
previously unrecognized connection in the scholarly literature: 
internationalizing the Erie doctrine may in part explain the increased use of 
the forum non conveniens doctrine by federal district courts.  I conclude 
this Part by discussing the appropriate relationship between the Erie 
doctrine and international conflict of laws. 
A. Erie’s Rationales Applied to International Conflict of Laws 
1. The Rules of Decision Act.—The Court’s first rationale for the Erie 
doctrine was that the Rules of Decision Act required the application of the 
positive and common laws of the several states.184  While the Court has 
never clearly rested Klaxon and its progeny on this rationale,185 some brief 
remarks on this rationale in the context of international conflict of laws are 
in order. 
Even assuming that the Act would apply to domestic conflict of 
laws,186 its applicability to international conflict of laws is questionable.  
 
179  Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938). 
180  See id. at 74–80. 
181  Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
182  Id. 
183  See, e.g., Lafferty v. St. Riel, 495 F.3d 72, 76–77 (3d Cir. 2007); Camacho v. Tex. Workforce 
Comm’n, 445 F.3d 407, 409 (5th Cir. 2006). 
184  Erie, 304 U.S. at 71–74. 
185  See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32 
(1963) (“In Klaxon . . . the Supreme Court held that a federal district court, when enforcing state-created 
rights, must make initial reference to the whole law of the state in which the court is physically located.  
It so held without making . . . reference to the language, history, or purpose of the Rules of Decision 
Act . . . .”). 
186  But see, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 91, at 1209 (“If, in resolving a conflict of state laws, a ‘court 
is to seek a [choice-of-law rule] . . . which would either reflect . . . multi-state policies or provide the 
basis for . . . accommodation of the laws’ conflicting purposes,’ a supreme federal law of conflict of 
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Under the Act, the substantive laws to be applied by federal courts sitting in 
diversity are “[t]he laws of the several states, except where the Constitution 
or treaties of the United States” shall “otherwise require or provide.”187  A 
foreign state is not one of the several states referred to in the Act.  
Furthermore, at the time the Act was enacted, there was general agreement 
that the application of foreign law by U.S. courts, be they federal or state, 
was not required.  As Justice Joseph Story detailed in his seminal 
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, it is “an essential attribute of every 
sovereignty[] that it has no admitted superior[] and that it gives the supreme 
law within its own domains on all subjects appertaining to its sovereignty.  
What it yields, it is its own choice to yield; and it cannot be commanded by 
another to yield it as a matter of right.”188  Justice Story also stated that 
“[w]hatever extra-territorial force [laws] are to have, is the result, not of any 
original power to extend them abroad, but of that respect, which from 
motives of public policy, other nations are disposed to yield to them.”189  
Such “respect” is offered as an “imperfect,” as opposed to “absolute,” 
obligation to apply foreign law.190  As Douglas Laycock has explained, 
“[h]ow U.S. courts treat foreign law is a matter of comity and diplomacy, 
the voluntary choice of a sovereign power.”191  So, even to the extent that 
the Act required the application of the positive and common law of the 
several states, it cannot be said that it similarly required the application of 
foreign law.192 
The Court’s failure to even consider this in Klaxon is perhaps due to 
the fact that Justice Story’s comity doctrine had been replaced by the time 
of Erie with Joseph Beale’s “vested rights” approach, which was influential 
during the first half of the twentieth century.193  Under the “vested rights” 
approach, the forum court gives effect to any right that had “vested” within 
the territory of a foreign sovereign.194  According to Beale, “the chief task of 
the Conflict of Laws [is] to determine the place where a right arose and the 
 
laws should . . . be the source of the choice-of-law rule.” (first omission in original) (footnote omitted)). 
187  28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).  The Rules of Decision Act was originally contained in § 34 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789.  Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (establishing that “the laws of 
the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise 
require or provide” will be the “rules of decision . . . where they apply”). 
188  STORY, supra note 22, § 8. 
189  Id. § 7. 
190  Id.; see generally Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International 
Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11 (2010) (analyzing the obligation to apply foreign 
law in conflict-of-laws thought). 
191  Laycock, supra note 15, at 259. 
192  See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 20 (1991) (noting 
that for Story “comity did not obligate courts to apply foreign law”). 
193  HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 34, § 2.10. 
194  See supra Part II.A. 
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law that created [the right].”195  In so arguing, Beale abandoned the comity 
doctrine and “rejected the role of the forum as ultimate policymaker in 
private international cases.”196 
Even assuming this was the view that the Klaxon Court was operating 
under, it still does not compel, as a statutory matter, the conclusion that 
conflict-of-laws rules directing a federal court to apply foreign law must be 
applied.  The Act explicitly requires the application of either the “laws of 
the several states” or federal law.197  The last phrase of the Act directs 
federal courts to apply state rules, even those directing the application of 
foreign law, “in cases where they apply.”198  This phrase leaves open the 
question of which law “applies,” which is the conflict-of-laws question.199 
2. The Constitutional Argument.—Another rationale given by the 
Court for the Erie doctrine, and likewise never examined in Klaxon and 
Day, was that the Constitution prevented federal courts from making 
general common law.200  In the Court’s view, because Congress has no 
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable to the states, 
the federal courts similarly have no power.201  Klaxon intimates Erie’s 
constitutional analysis by explaining that “the prohibition declared in 
Erie . . . against such independent determinations by the federal courts 
extends to the field of conflict of laws . . . It is not for the federal courts to 
thwart [state] . . . policies by enforcing an independent ‘general law’ of 
conflict of laws.”202 
But the Court in Klaxon failed to consider, as it failed to consider in 
Day, whether Article III would authorize Congress or the courts to create 
general federal conflict-of-laws rules.  As Patrick Woolley has argued, 
“[t]here can be no question that the federal government must have some 
authority with respect to choice of law under Article III of the Constitution” 
and as such “there is no reason to think that federal courts in diversity cases 
are constitutionally compelled to apply the whole law of the state in which 
they sit.”203  Courts and other commentators have similarly recognized 
 
195  BEALE, supra note 98, § 8A.8. 
196  Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public 
and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 284–85 (1982). 
197  28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006). 
198  Id. 
199  See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 185, at 41 (“The phrase ‘in cases where they apply’ has a quality of 
deliberate flexibility that suggests the drafters did not think it wise to attempt specification of the cases 
to which any one state’s law would apply.”). 
200  See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“[N]o clause in the Constitution purports to 
confer . . . power [to promulgate general common law] upon the federal courts.”). 
201  Id. at 78–79; see also Friendly, supra note 56, at 395 (noting that “it would be . . . unreasonable 
to suppose that the federal courts have a law-making power which the federal legislature does not”). 
202  Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
203  Woolley, supra note 90, at 1759–60. 
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this.204  And, as noted above, it is hard to construct a constitutional argument 
requiring federal courts to apply foreign law when its application by U.S. 
courts is voluntary, which is the near universal position of all modern 
conflict-of-laws theories.205 
Furthermore, while the Erie doctrine is now well known for the 
proposition that “[t]here is no federal general common law,”206 that 
statement is subject to qualification.207  While there may be no “general 
common law” as existed at the time of Swift, there certainly are limited 
areas of “specialized” common law to be applied constitutionally by the 
federal courts after Erie.208  These areas differ from Swift’s general common 
law because they fall within areas of unique federal competence, such as 
foreign affairs, as opposed to purely local and state concerns.209  Indeed, as 
one scholar recently noted, there are many areas of procedural common law 
that seemingly fall outside of Erie’s dictates.210  Given the foreign affairs 
implications for international conflict of laws, it is questionable whether 
Erie’s constitutional argument is fully applicable to international conflict-
of-laws cases.211 
 
204  See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc., 285 F.3d 630, 636 n.10 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that 
“[w]e do not mean to intimate that Klaxon is constitutionally compelled”); Friendly, supra note 56, at 
401–02 (“For Congress to direct a federal court sitting in State A whether to apply the internal law of 
State A, B, C, or to use its own judgment . . . can well be said to be ‘necessary and proper’ to enabling 
federal judges to function . . . in a way that [prescribing law] . . . is not.”). 
205  See Laycock, supra note 15, at 259 (“How U.S. courts treat foreign law is a matter of comity and 
diplomacy, the voluntary choice of a sovereign power.”); Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General 
Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 567 (2006) (“Klaxon should not be seen as a broad precedent for 
incorporating local law on matters that general American jurisprudence could govern.  Not only is its 
apparent rationale quite narrow, but Klaxon itself illustrates the dangers of letting the local law of 
individual states govern matters that seem intrinsically federal.”); Young, supra note 30, at 471 
(acknowledging that state court application of foreign law is voluntary but warning that “[s]tate court 
refusals to apply international law may . . . undermine the ability of the federal political branches to 
conduct foreign policy and therefore raise significant constitutional issues not present in the domestic 
context”). 
206  Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
207  Indeed, on the very same day the Erie decision was announced, the Court announced another 
case, also written by Justice Brandeis, applying federal common law.  See Hinderlider v. La Plata River 
& Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). 
208  Judge Friendly is credited with first proposing this distinction.  See Friendly, supra note 56, at 
405 (“The clarion yet careful pronouncement of Erie, ‘There is no federal general common law,’ opened 
the way to what, for want of a better term, we may call specialized federal common law.” (quoting Erie, 
304 U.S. at 78)). 
209  See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988); United States v. Kimbell 
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).  
An extensive body of federal common law derives from federal legislation that impliedly authorizes 
federal common law.  See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997); Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964). 
210  See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 819–35 (2008) 
(comparing and contrasting substantive and procedural common law). 
211  I will develop these arguments more completely infra Part IV. 
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3. Forum Shopping.—The Court has never relied on the above 
rationales to support the application of the Erie doctrine to international 
conflict-of-laws cases.  Instead, the Court’s stated rationale in Klaxon was 
that a contrary rule would (1) defeat the Erie doctrine by allowing courts to 
escape the application of forum law through the conflict-of-laws process 
and (2) encourage nonuniformity and forum shopping.212  Klaxon’s rejection 
of a federal conflict-of-laws rule for federal diversity cases was “prompted 
by a preference for intrastate uniformity over interstate uniformity because 
intrastate forum shopping was perceived as the more serious and more 
likely evil.”213 
There are serious questions as to whether these rationales are 
effectuated by the application of the Erie doctrine to transnational cases.  In 
fact, the very application of forum conflict-of-laws rules may encourage 
forum shopping even though uniformity is encouraged between federal and 
state courts sitting in the same state.  It has been noted that, “the last thirty 
years have seen a growing torrent of” cases filed in the United States with 
international and foreign issues.214  This growth may be due in part to a 
foreign plaintiff’s ability to forum shop his way into a U.S. court in hopes 
of finding a more favorable forum.215  Utilizing alienage jurisdiction216 and 
permissive personal jurisdiction doctrines,217 foreign plaintiffs can file their 
cases in various U.S. courts.218  This gives plaintiffs the choice of several 
conflict-of-laws rules leading to the application of various substantive laws.  
A smart plaintiff would thus compare the conflict-of-laws rules of several 
states, determine which rule would require the federal court sitting in 
 
212  Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); see also supra Parts I.B, II.A. 
213  Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
2001, 2027–28 (2008). 
214  HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS v (2008). 
215  See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Lex Loci Delictus and Global Economic Welfare: 
Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1137 (2007) (“[M]odern choice-of-law 
approaches give plaintiffs an incentive to sue in a forum that has more generous tort laws than the place 
of injury.”). 
216  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2006) (permitting suits between non-U.S. citizens and U.S. citizens). 
217  See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 
(Martinus Nijhoff Pubs., 2003) (“The analysis employed in [International Shoe] increases the number of 
available forums, with the result that ordinarily a plaintiff’s forum is produced.”). 
218  While both domestic and foreign plaintiffs may request that a court apply foreign law, domestic 
plaintiffs are less likely to do so.  Cf. Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of 
Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 721 (2009) (noting that there exist “strong biases favoring 
domestic over foreign law, domestic over foreign litigants, and plaintiffs over defendants” (footnote 
omitted)).  But see id. at 722 (arguing that supporters of the “strong bias” view “underestimate the 
influence of choice-of-law doctrine on judges’ decisions and overestimate the extent of bias in those 
decisions”). 
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diversity to apply the most favorable substantive law (be it foreign or 
domestic), and then file suit in the most favorable court.219 
For example, a foreign plaintiff seeking to have foreign law applied to 
an injury sustained abroad might choose to file a lawsuit against a 
California corporation in Virginia or another state (where the corporation is 
subject to personal jurisdiction) that still follows the First Restatement220 
because the First Restatement’s conflict-of-laws rules would direct the 
federal court to apply the substantive law of the place of injury and thus 
foreign law.221  The choice to forum shop away from California’s 
“comparative impairment” approach222 would thus be made if Virginia’s 
conflicts rules were more favorable to the plaintiff and resulted in the 
application of favorable substantive law to the plaintiff’s case.223  Of course, 
a plaintiff might prefer to have California’s conflicts rules applied if foreign 
law were not helpful to the plaintiff’s claim.  Thus, a serious criticism of the 
Klaxon/Day line of cases is that they might actually encourage forum 
shopping in international cases.224  While there is some recent empirical 
evidence calling into question the significance of the forum-shopping 
problem in transnational cases,225 the fact that the rationale for the Court’s 
decisions in these cases is not effectuated by the rule is problematic. 
4. An Unintended Consequence: Forum Non Conveniens.—There is 
also cause for concern because the problem of forum shopping is being 
resolved not through the application or nonapplication of foreign 
 
219  See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and 
Innovation, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 51, 59 (Martha 
Minow, Michael Ryan & Austin Sarat eds., 1992) (explaining the “strategic behavior entailed in forum 
shopping”). 
220  See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: Twenty-Third 
Annual Survey, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 231–32 tbl.1 (2010) (listing the conflict-of-laws rules of the 
several states). 
221  See, e.g., Hodson v. A. H. Robins Co., 528 F. Supp. 809, 823 (E.D. Va. 1981) (finding “that the 
Virginia rule in personal injury actions is that the law of the place of the injury, the lex loci delecti [sic], 
will control” and thus that “[s]ince plaintiffs’ injuries were incurred in England, the laws of that country 
must be applied in the present cases”). 
222  See, e.g., Pubali Bank v. City Nat’l Bank, 777 F.2d 1340, 1343 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding under 
California’s “comparative impairment test” that California had the greatest interest in a breach of 
contract and fraud action brought by a foreign bank against a California bank, and thus California law 
applied). 
223  See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 383 (2006) (“The law 
regularly provides more than one authorized, legitimate forum . . . . To shop among those legitimate 
choices for the forum that offers the potential for the most favorable outcome is the only rational 
decision under rational choice theory and game theory because forum shopping maximizes the client’s 
expected payoff.”); Ghei & Parisi, supra note 107, at 1372 (“[P]laintiffs will generally seek to file 
claims in jurisdictions where the expected net gain is the largest.  The amount of litigation is likely to be 
positively correlated with the extent to which the jurisdiction’s laws favor plaintiffs.”). 
224  See, e.g., FALLON, MANNING, MELTZER & SHAPIRO, supra note 13 (collecting sources). 
225  Whytock, supra note 24.  But see infra Part III.A.4 (updating empirical evidence). 
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substantive law, but through the procedural doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.226  One consequence of internationalizing the Erie doctrine is 
that it thrusts federal courts into undertaking forum non conveniens 
analyses, and one result of the mechanistic application of the Erie doctrine 
to international cases may be increased use of forum non conveniens 
dismissals by federal district courts.227The forum non conveniens doctrine 
empowers a federal district court to dismiss a transnational case in favor of 
an alternative foreign court “when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to 
hear [the] case, and . . . trial in the chosen forum would 
establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all 
proportion to plaintiff’s convenience, or . . . the chosen forum [is] 
inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court’s own 
administrative and legal problems.”228 
In making the decision about whether to dismiss a case on forum non 
conveniens grounds, a court must evaluate various public and private 
factors, which include, among other things, the location of the evidence and 
witnesses, the plaintiff’s motive in bringing suit in the forum, and various 
issues of judicial administration, such as docket congestion.229  A court may 
choose to dismiss under forum non conveniens even though it has 
jurisdiction over the case and, under recent Supreme Court caselaw, a court 
may dismiss even without determining whether it has jurisdiction.230 
While the Supreme Court has declined to catalogue all of the 
circumstances where dismissal would be proper,231 one of the leading 
rationales for allowing a court to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds 
is that international cases would require complicated applications of foreign 
law.232  Indeed, many lower courts have given this factor substantial and 
decisive weight in the forum non conveniens analysis.233  While this factor 
is not conclusive,234 the Court has emphasized that the doctrine “is designed 
 
226  See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Lear, Federalism, Forum Shopping, and the Foreign Injury Paradox, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 87, 87 (2009). 
227  See, e.g., John Bies, Conditioning Forum Non Conveniens, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 489, 489 (2000) 
(recognizing the relationship between the “explosion of international civil litigation in U.S. courts” and 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens); Whytock, supra note 24, at 495 (similarly recognizing the 
relationship). 
228  Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429 (2007) (alterations in 
original) (quoting Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 446–48 (1994)). 
229  Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 & n.6, 259–60 (1981); see also BORN & 
RUTLEDGE, supra note 129, at 393–98 (explaining the various factors that come into play). 
230  See, e.g., Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 429. 
231  Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). 
232  See id. at 509; see generally CURRIE, supra note 116, at 356–58 (discussing the invocation of 
forum non conveniens to avoid the application of unfamiliar foreign law). 
233  E.g., Scottish Air Int’l, Inc. v. British Caledonian Grp., PLC, 81 F.3d 1224, 1234–35 (2d Cir. 
1996); Ilusorio v. Ilusorio-Bildner, 103 F. Supp. 2d 672, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
234  See Piper, 454 U.S. at 251, 259–60. 
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in part to help courts avoid conducting complex exercises in comparative 
law. . . . [T]he public interest factors point towards dismissal where the 
court would be required to ‘untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in 
law foreign to itself.’”235 
There has been a significant increase in forum non conveniens 
decisions.236 Between 1990 and 2005, there were roughly 691 (about 43 per 
year) reported transnational forum non conveniens decisions by federal 
courts.237  Overall, the courts dismissed in favor of a foreign forum in about 
50% of these cases.238  In cases where a foreign plaintiff was involved, the 
dismissal rate was higher, at 63%.239  As Christopher Whytock explained in 
the most recent study of the subject, “the signal seems to be that foreign 
plaintiffs are twice as likely to have their suits dismissed” compared to 
domestic plaintiffs.240  One potential reason for these results is that federal 
courts are resisting the application of foreign law that may be required 
under the Erie doctrine because they do not wish to “untangle” complicated 
problems of foreign law required by state conflict-of-laws rules.  To the 
extent that forum non conveniens decisions appear to be driven by the 
biases of district court judges as opposed to legal standards,241 which is 
contestable,242 that bias is perhaps accounted for by the presence of foreign 
law in the case.  Put another way, perhaps federal district court judges are 
dismissing suits on forum non conveniens grounds to avoid cases involving 
the application of foreign law.  At a minimum, Whytock’s study confirms 
that the presence of foreign law in a case may have a significant impact on a 
court’s decision to dismiss.243  Foreign law is generally present in a case 
 
235  Id. at 251. 
236  Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 
1081, 1092 (2010). 
237  Christopher A. Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial Governance: 
The Case of Forum Non Conveniens 15 (Feb. 28, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969033. 
238  Id. at 16. 
239  Whytock, supra note 24, at 503.  This is likely accounted for by the fact that in conducting the 
forum non conveniens analysis a court may give less deference to a foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum 
under Supreme Court caselaw.  See Piper, 454 U.S. at 255–56 (“When the home forum [is] chosen, it is 
reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient.  When the plaintiff is foreign . . . this assumption 
is . . . less reasonable.  Because the central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that 
the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff’s choice deserves less deference.”).  While not my concern 
here, I note that such a demonstrated disparity between domestic and foreign plaintiffs may itself have 
implications for U.S. foreign relations.  See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 129, at 380 (noting that a 
failure to afford equal access to the courts may violate various treaties to which the United States is a 
signatory); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 281–82 (5th ed. 2006) 
(same). 
240  Whytock, supra note 24, at 503–04. 
241  Elizabeth T. Lear, National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non Conveniens, 41 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 559, 603 (2007). 
242  Whytock, supra note 218, at 721–22. 
243  See id. at 765 tbl.2 (comparing domestic and foreign law results). 
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because the Erie doctrine requires its application under state conflict-of-
laws rules.  Application of the Erie doctrine to international cases, 
therefore, may lead federal courts to dismiss cases in which state conflict-
of-law rules require the application of foreign law, especially if the plaintiff 
is foreign and federal courts might prefer foreign fora for international cases 
even when the cases are appropriately within their jurisdiction.244 
It is possible that the invocation of the forum non conveniens doctrine 
will grow in future years in light of recent Supreme Court precedent 
encouraging the doctrine’s use.245  In fact, a search of cases invoking the 
doctrine after the Supreme Court’s decision in Sinochem246 confirms that 
motions to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens are on the rise.  
While Whytock’s study showed about a 50% dismissal rate, approximately 
43 cases per year, for the period between 1990 and 2005, which is before 
the Court’s Sinochem decision,247 research conducted for this Article 
starting in 2007, after the Court decided Sinochem, presents a more nuanced 
picture.248 
Since Sinochem, 83 reported cases have raised the issue (about 20 per 
year).249  Of those, 52% were dismissed.  Of these dismissals, 84% 
explicitly recognized that a reason for dismissal was the application of 
foreign law.250  These numbers likely underreport the real impact of the 
doctrine on cases before the federal courts.  Since 2007, federal courts have 
increasingly dealt with these issues through unpublished opinions—going 
from reporting 45% of these cases in 2007 to only 15% in 2010.251  Indeed, 
during the timeframe of Whytock’s study, the reporting rate was closer to 
45%.252  While the dismissal rate for unpublished decisions hovers around 
 
244  See, e.g., Lear, supra note 241, at 561 (“Following Justice Thurgood Marshall’s lead in 
Piper . . . federal judges presume that the accident forum has the greatest interest in adjudicating a 
foreign injury dispute.  This presumption applies across the board.”). 
245  See Robertson, supra note 236, at 1089. 
246  Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007). 
247  Whytock, supra note 237, at 15–16. 
248  See Memorandum from Donald Earl Childress III (Aug. 18, 2011) (on file with author).  In 
short, the approach was as follows: First, the Westlaw database was searched for all U.S. district court 
cases raising the term “forum non conveniens” between March 5, 2007 (the date of the Sinochem 
decision) and April 1, 2011.  Second, all decisions were then reviewed and cases that were not actual 
decisions by U.S. federal district courts granting or denying a forum non conveniens motion in favor of 
a foreign forum were discarded.  Third, these cases were then analyzed to yield the results explained in 
the text above. 
249  The average is reached by taking into account data from March 5, 2007 to April 1, 2011.  Id.   
250  Id. 
251  Id. 
252  This number was reached by comparing the number of published cases to unpublished cases 
during the time of Whytock’s study.  This statistic suffers from some incompleteness, as there is no 
good denominator because not all published and unpublished cases are included in the available 
databases.  In short, it is complicated to estimate publication rates based on current databases.  
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50%, what is striking is that there were 223 such cases since Sinochem.253  
Of these unreported cases, 73% explicitly recognized the application of 
foreign law as a reason for dismissal.254  In sum, there have been a total of 
approximately 306 cases since Sinochem with an average of 75.5% 
recognizing foreign law as an important factor in dismissing the case.255  
Therefore, courts may be resisting application of foreign law under the Erie 
doctrine through the forum non conveniens doctrine, and the trend to do so 
is growing with courts pushing such decisions to unreported cases. 
Elizabeth Lear has documented the problems raised by this growing 
use of the forum non conveniens doctrine.  Lear argues that “[t]he federal 
courts treat the [forum non conveniens analysis] as a less analytically 
demanding form of choice of law analysis” that “obscures the significant 
American interests at stake in the adjudication of foreign injury claims.”256  
Rather than conduct a standard conflict-of-laws analysis, the process is 
short-circuited by the potential application of foreign law.257  Judges, 
resisting the application of foreign law and perhaps feeling required to 
apply foreign law under state conflict-of-laws rules, dismiss cases even 
though, because a conflict-of-laws analysis was never conducted, foreign 
law might not be applicable to the case at bar.258  Put simply, one result of 
the mechanistic application of the Erie doctrine to international cases may 
be an increased use of forum non conveniens dismissals by federal district 
courts.259 
This is especially problematic as it relates to the Erie doctrine.  
Because no federal forum non conveniens statute exists, it is arguable that 
the doctrine should be governed by state law in federal diversity actions.260  
However, the Supreme Court has avoided deciding the status of the doctrine 
on this issue.261  While the trend of the caselaw is to treat the doctrine as a 
federal rule of procedural law in federal courts,262 this uncertainty has real-
 
253  See Memorandum from Donald Earl Childress III, supra note 248. 
254  Id. 
255  Id. 
256  Lear, supra note 241, at 568–70. 
257  See, e.g., McNeil v. Stanley Works, 33 F.App’x 322, 324–25 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that no 
choice-of-law determination is needed when a case is dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens). 
258  See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 129, at 422 (“Both the location of the disputed conduct and 
the competing national interests are key considerations in contemporary U.S. choice of law standards.”). 
259  At least one leading commentator has similarly recognized this connection.  See Stephen B. 
Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National Law, 
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 212 (2001) (noting that forum non conveniens implicates choice of law). 
260  BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 129, at 428. 
261  Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981); Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 
501, 509 (1947). 
262  See, e.g., Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994) (finding that state courts are 
“are not bound by the federal common-law venue rule . . . of forum non conveniens . . . [b]ecause the 
doctrine is one of procedure rather than substance”); Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 502 (holding that a district 
court “has inherent power to dismiss a suit pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens”). 
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world implications because state forum non conveniens law sometimes 
differs from the Supreme Court’s analysis in Piper.263  As such, the doctrine 
may itself defeat Erie’s aims by encouraging forum shopping: Plaintiffs 
will understandably forum shop for state courts that do not have forum non 
conveniens doctrines, or for state courts that have different and more 
favorable doctrines than federal courts.264 
 
 * * * 
 
In sum, the manipulation of conflict-of-laws rules by a federal court 
seeking to thwart the substantive law of one state in favor of the substantive 
law of another state certainly raises an issue of constitutional import.265  It is 
less obvious that similar constitutional concerns are raised when a federal 
court is required by state conflict-of-laws rules to apply foreign law.  It does 
not obviously violate principles of federalism for a federal court to make an 
independent determination of whether a foreign substantive rule of law 
should be binding, especially considering that the application of foreign law 
is voluntary.  Furthermore, and contrary to the Court’s rationales for its 
decisions in Klaxon and Day, nonuniformity and forum shopping are 
encouraged by the application of the Erie doctrine to international cases.  
The expansion of globalization and jurisdiction affords plaintiffs almost 
unlimited choice concerning where to bring suit.  Because states have 
various approaches to choice of law, “[t]his combination means that even a 
state with no connection to the particular transaction can use its choice of 
law approach to select the law or laws applicable to the transaction.”266  Put 
another way, because a litigant will have the benefit of various conflict-of-
laws rules, depending upon the conflict-of-laws rules of the state in which 
the case is filed, litigants will be encouraged to forum shop.  Erie’s 
application to foreign law, whatever the rationale, is at best “attenuated” 
due to the international dimension of choosing foreign law.267 
This attenuated relationship may have led courts to seek recourse in the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens to avoid the application of foreign law.  
What is striking, however, is that many forum non conveniens decisions 
never conduct a conflict-of-laws analysis.268  So, a defendant might alert a 
 
263  BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 129, at 428; see generally Piper, 454 U.S. at 235. 
264  BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 129, at 431. 
265  See Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of 
Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1861 n.142 (2005) (“A federal court disregarding state 
choice-of-law rules would no more be applying the law of that state than would a federal court applying 
one section of a state statute while ignoring another.  Whatever constitutional bar exists to the latter 
practice also forbids the former.”). 
266  Silberman, supra note 213, at 2028. 
267  See Brainerd Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964, 
965 n.2 (1958). 
268  Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REV. 
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federal district court to the potential relevance of foreign law by making a 
forum non conveniens motion.  Reflexively assuming that foreign law is 
applicable, a court may dismiss the case in favor of a foreign forum.  While 
foreign law may be applicable, it might be the case that the district court 
could apply forum law or some other state’s law under state conflict-of-
laws rules.  Thus, to the extent that conflict-of-laws analyses are not being 
conducted by district courts before determining forum non conveniens 
motions, courts may be dismissing cases under the mistaken belief that 
foreign law must be applied.269  This may mean that the federal courts are 
needlessly closing their doors to transnational cases on account of a 
mistaken analysis of the underlying substantive law.270 
B. Should the Erie Doctrine Apply in International Cases? 
The Erie decision left open the question of whether the doctrine should 
be applied in international cases.  The question of whether state law, federal 
common law, or foreign law should guide the courts in international cases is 
thus not a new question.271  In fact, the ink was barely dry on the Erie 
decision when a leading scholar first recognized that the case might have 
profound, and in some cases pernicious, implications if applied in 
international cases.  Writing the year after the decision was issued, Philip 
Jessup argued forcefully that any attempt to expand the Erie decision to 
international cases 
should be repudiated by the Supreme Court.  Mr. Justice Brandeis was surely 
not thinking of international law when he wrote his dictum.  Any question of 
applying international law in our courts involves the foreign relations of the 
United States and can thus be brought within a federal power. . . . The several 
states of the Union are entities unknown to international law.  It would be as 
unsound as it would be unwise to make our state courts our ultimate authority 
for pronouncing the rules of international law.272 
Jessup’s concern was directed at the application of the Erie doctrine to 
customary international law.273  Following Jessup, another esteemed 
 
309, 356–57 (2002). 
269  See id. at 358 (“[I]t is possible to find examples of cases where forum non conveniens dismissal 
appears to follow automatically from the conclusion that foreign law was applicable.”). 
270  Cf. Robertson, supra note 236 (examining the problems with closing U.S. courts to transnational 
cases). 
271  See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 289 (1986) (“The resolution [of conflicts with an international component] is a 
particularly delicate matter because the confrontation between laws and policies of the United States and 
foreign states are often sharper and more complex than any analogous showdown between two states.”). 
272  Philip C. Jessup, Editorial Content, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to 
International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 743 (1939).  Jessup was not specifically speaking about 
international conflict of laws because Erie had not yet been applied there, although he did reference 
conflict of laws in a footnote, thus anticipating Erie’s application in those cases.  Id. at 741 n.3.  
273  Id. 
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scholar, Louis Henkin, recognized in the 1960s that the doctrine might have 
ramifications for conflict of laws.  As he explained, “[w]hen the law of a 
foreign country is concerned, the choice of law rules hardly are a matter of 
primarily local policy and concern; they impinge on national interests and 
the foreign relations of the United States.”274  According to Henkin, 
“[i]nternational conflicts, then, may raise federal questions on which states 
do not call the tune but must follow the federal lead.”275 
The Supreme Court similarly recognized this in Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino, a case involving whether the Court would sit in 
judgment over an act done by the Cuban government that arguably violated 
international law.276  The Court noted that the effect to be given to the act of 
a foreign state is controlled by federal law, even in a diversity action.277  
Explicitly taking up Jessup’s argument, the Court explained that 
[w]e could perhaps in this diversity action avoid the question of deciding 
whether federal or state law is applicable to this aspect of the litigation.  New 
York has enunciated the act of state doctrine in terms that echo those of federal 
decisions . . . . Thus our conclusions might well be the same whether we dealt 
with this problem as one of state law . . . or federal law.  However, we are 
constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice 
regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National 
Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international 
community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law.  It seems 
fair to assume that the Court did not have rules like the act of state doctrine in 
mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.  Soon thereafter, Professor 
Philip C. Jessup, now a judge of the International Court of Justice, recognized 
the potential dangers were Erie extended to legal problems affecting 
international relations.  He cautioned that rules of international law should not 
be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations.  His basic 
rationale is equally applicable to the act of state doctrine.278 
Although the act of state doctrine has been limited by Congress and the 
Court,279 Sabbatino stands for the proposition that federal courts have 
authority in cases related to foreign affairs to fashion federal common law 
 
274  Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM L. REV. 
805, 820 n.51 (1964). 
275  Id. 
276  376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
277  See id. at 424. 
278  Id. at 424–25 (footnotes omitted). 
279  22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2006); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 
(1976); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). 
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conflict-of-laws rules280 and that state courts are required to apply such rules 
as a matter of federal law.281 
The fact that Sabbatino involved a conflict-of-laws rule bears 
reemphasis.282  The decision should not be read as authorizing federal courts 
to create federal common law, especially of a substantive form, in any case 
touching foreign affairs.  Indeed, the issue of whether customary 
international law has the status of self-executing federal law to be 
ascertained and applied by federal courts has been the subject of recent 
scholarly debate.283  The so-called “orthodox view,” articulated by Harold 
Koh and others, is that “[c]ustomary international law is considered to be 
like common law in the United States, but it is federal law.”284  As such, it 
has the status of self-executing federal common law and is to be “applied by 
courts in the United States without any need for it to be enacted or 
implemented by Congress.”285  In a seminal article critiquing Professor 
Koh’s position, Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith argued that, post-Erie, a 
federal court could no longer apply customary international law in the 
absence of some domestic authorization by the Constitution or political 
branches.286 
 
280  See Chow, supra note 31, at 169 (arguing that “when the use of state law to decide international 
choice of law issues may compromise significant federal interests, federal and state courts should apply 
a federal common law rule that preempts state law”). 
281  BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 129, at 767 (collecting cases). 
282  See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 175, 178 (1967) (“If there were no act of state doctrine, a domestic court in a case like 
Sabbatino would decide it on ‘conflicts’ principles. . . . The act of state doctrine, however, says that 
foreign ‘law’ . . . must govern certain transactions and that no public policy of the forum may stand in 
the way.”); Henkin, supra note 274, at 805, 809 (noting that the “Act of State” doctrine articulated in 
Sabbatino “might have been part of the federal common law of that time, a special principle of conflict 
of laws applicable in the federal courts”). 
283  See, e.g., Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 29, at 869 (describing the debate). 
284  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 cmt. d (1987) (“International 
agreements of the United States other than treaties, and customary international law, while not 
mentioned explicitly in the Supremacy Clause, are also federal law and as such are supreme over State 
law.” (citation omitted)).  For a more in-depth review of the debate, see Koh, supra note 30, at 1825–26; 
Young, supra note 30, at 367–70. 
285  Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1561 
(1984); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (exemplifying the application of the 
approach); In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(same). 
286  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 29; see also Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of 
Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 671 (1986) (“[C]ustomary international law has 
not traditionally been applied by American courts . . . . There is no basis for the notion that it is a kind of 
constitutional common law, suitable as a doctrinal vehicle for restraining acts of the political 
branches.”); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 1, 47–48 (1995) (“Longstanding judicial construction of the reach of executive authority in the area of 
international relations establishes that an attempt by the federal courts to control foreign policy 
determinations in order to enforce international law is . . . a judicial usurpation.”). 
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The Sabbatino decision has been central to these arguments because 
the Court used federal common law in that case.  Those arguing for the 
orthodox view have used the case for the general proposition that federal 
courts may create federal common law in the case of customary 
international law.287  The revisionists have argued that the case should not 
be read that broadly,288 noting that the Court has explicitly recognized more 
recently that even in the foreign relations context, “the general practice has 
been to look for legislative guidance before exercising innovative authority 
over substantive law.”289 
In my view, Sabbatino’s holding is modest—it is that federal courts 
may fashion federal common law conflict-of-laws rules in international 
cases, but only in some limited circumstances that implicate important 
national foreign policy concerns.  The following Part will proceed with that 
holding in mind. Regardless of what that case means for customary 
international law, the case shows that the uncritical application of the Erie 
doctrine to international cases is questionable.  At a minimum, as Jack 
Goldsmith has noted, in light of Sabbatino, the scope of Day’s “holding 
with respect to choice of law in transnational cases is uncertain.”290  What to 
do with the uncertainty of that holding is the subject of the next Part. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL ERIE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The foregoing analysis calls into question the strict command of 
Klaxon, as interpreted in Day, requiring a federal district court to apply the 
conflict-of-laws rules of the state in which it sits even when those rules 
point the court to an application of foreign law.  The question, of course, is 
why should this small ounce of clarity in the murky waters of Erie be 
clouded once again?  The answer is that changed circumstances since the 
Klaxon and Day decisions were issued counsel in favor of a reconsideration 
of the doctrine’s application to international conflict-of-laws cases.  After 
showing the problem that exists when Erie is applied in private 
international law cases, I offer a sounder approach that could be employed 
by courts. 
 
287  See, e.g., Koh, supra note 30, at 1847 (“The Sabbatino Court found such federal common 
lawmaking to be justified by explicit constitutional grants and the need to maintain national uniformity 
in areas of uniquely federal interest.”). 
288  See, e.g., Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 29, at 886 (“[Revisionists] noted that the 
application of a [customary international law] of human rights as federal common law would be contrary 
to the post-Erie requirement that federal common law conform to the policies of the federal political 
branches.”). 
289  Id. at 902 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004)). 
290  Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1634 
n.78 (1997). 
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A. The Uniqueness of Private International Law for Erie’s Aims 
There have been a significant number of cases raising international 
conflict-of-laws issues in recent years.291  The most recent study reviewing 
federal cases from 1990 through 2005 found that there were approximately 
200 cases during that period that raised the issue of whether foreign law 
should be applied in tort cases.292  Additionally, the real number could be 
higher, given that the study excluded cases where a choice-of-law decision 
was not made by the court.293  At a minimum, the Whytock analysis 
explained earlier294 shows the substantial impact of foreign law questions on 
cases filed in federal courts.  Indeed, from 1990 to 2005, the Whytock study 
reported that 85 decisions were made regarding international conflict of 
laws in the context of motions to dismiss on grounds of forum non 
conveniens.295  To the extent that the issue is being raised, many courts have 
reflexively applied the law of foreign states as if it were the law of the 
several states.296  Overall, courts applied foreign law in 63% of all cases, 
91% of forum non conveniens cases, and 45% of cases outside of the forum 
non conveniens context.297  Or, courts dismissed international cases on 
grounds of forum non conveniens without conducting a conflict-of-laws 
analysis, which is not accounted for in the recent Whytock study.298  Recent 
trends showing an increased recourse to forum non conveniens motions also 
suggest that this question is increasingly important.  Furthermore, foreign 
law is frequently applied without the court asking a question implied by the 
 
291  Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation a Distinct Field? The Persistence of 
Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 301, 302 (2008) (noting that “in the 
coming years, the American legal system likely will continue to confront steady growth in the volume of 
litigation with an international dimension”); Alex Mills, Federalism in the European Union and the 
United States: Subsidiarity, Private Law, and the Conflict of Laws, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 369, 455 (2010) 
(noting that with the advent of globalization, international disputes and the attendant conflict-of-laws 
issues have become more frequent); Whytock, supra note 218, at 755 & n.188 (detailing the results of a 
study of published international tort cases in which choice-of-law issues arose between the years 1990 
through 2005, with a sample size of 213 cases). 
292  Whytock, supra note 218, at 755.  Whytock’s study is the most recent empirical study on the 
issue.  His article focused on tort cases because (1) prior studies similarly focused on these cases and (2) 
such cases are the “principal battlefield of the so-called choice-of-law revolution.”  Id. at 755 n.186 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
293  Id. at 755 n.188. 
294  See supra Part III.A.4. 
295  Whytock, supra note 218, at 755. 
296  The confusion of interstate and international conflicts analysis abounds throughout the scholarly 
literature, even though there are important differences in these types of cases that call for different 
analyses.  Laycock, supra note 15, at 259; see also Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Interstate and International 
Conflicts Law: A Plea for Segregation, 41 MINN. L. REV. 717, 723 (1957) (“Parallel and contributory to 
a possible divergence between the laws of international and interstate conflicts is the fact that the 
treatment of the former, both as to scope and merits, may not only differ from that of interstate conflicts, 
but even as to each foreign country involved.”). 
297  Whytock, supra note 218, at 765 tbl.2. 
298  Id. at 755 n.188. 
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Klaxon Court itself: Is it constitutional to apply the law of the foreign 
state?299  That question, in light of the Court’s decisions in Hague and 
Shutts, seemingly requires that a federal district court engage in some 
analysis to ensure that the relevant foreign state has some interest in the 
application of its law to the case.300  Courts have likely resisted this for fear 
that such inquiries might guide them back into general common law. 
In addition to these reasons, a reconsideration of the Erie doctrine’s 
application to international conflicts cases is in order because the several 
states employ different conflict-of-laws regimes.  This means that the Erie 
doctrine’s twin aims of “discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance 
of inequitable administration of the laws”301 may be frustrated in 
international conflicts cases as foreign plaintiffs forum shop for the most 
favorable substantive law within a patchwork of inconsistent approaches to 
conflicts law.  In contrast to the simple and clear rules that were nearly 
universally employed by the several states at the time Erie and Klaxon were 
decided, the states now employ a variety of conflict-of-laws approaches.302  
What follows is a brief overview of the present methodologies employed by 
the several states that illustrates the need for more clear and consistent 
federal rules. 
To begin with, fourteen states—Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, 
Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming—continue to 
apply the First Restatement in whole or in part to torts and contracts 
cases.303  For cases that raise international conflict-of-laws issues and are 
filed in diversity in federal district courts in these states, therefore, there is a 
strong possibility that, under Klaxon and Day, the federal district court 
would be required to apply foreign law.  Even beyond these states, foreign 
law might be necessary to apply under more modern conflict-of-laws rules 
that are employed in the majority of states, even though there might be 
varying degrees of contact necessary with the foreign state to justify the 
application of its law.304  Only two states apply the law of the forum to all 
cases sounding in tort—Kentucky and Michigan—while other states or 
districts, such as California and the District of Columbia, apply a version of 
interest analysis that strongly favors the application of forum law.305  All 
 
299  Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 495 (1941). 
300  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 
302, 320 (1981); see also supra Part II.B (explaining the Courts’ analyses in these cases). 
301  Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427–28 (1996) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 
380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
302  See supra Part II.A. 
303  Symeonides, supra note 220. 
304  See id. at 23031 (exploring in detail the theories of conflict of laws currently used by state 
courts). 
305  Id. at 230–31 tbl.1. 
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other states use some form of balancing, usually following the Second 
Restatement, which may direct the court to apply foreign law or forum law 
depending on the circumstances of the case.306 
Compounding this mishmash of conflict-of-laws rules at the state level 
are recent cases showing that federal district courts are resisting application 
of foreign law.  As explained earlier, forum non conveniens is now a 
growing trend in international litigations.307  The ostensible reasons for this 
are that courts dismiss a complaint in favor of a foreign forum having more 
connection to the case.  These dismissals are evidence that domestic federal 
courts are resisting the application of foreign law.  When federal district 
courts dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens, they usher in 
“boomerang litigation” and secondary battles in enforcement of judgment 
proceedings.  Boomerang litigation occurs when a U.S. court dismisses a 
case in favor of a foreign forum and then that forum is unable or unwilling 
to hear the case.308  The case then comes back before the U.S. court.  In 
other words, a case bounces back and forth between jurisdictions without 
ever reaching the merits, which is highly inefficient as a matter of judicial 
administration.309 
In the enforcement-of-judgments context, if the case proceeds to trial 
and judgment in a foreign forum, the judgment creditor will seek execution 
of the judgment and attachment of the debtor’s assets in a U.S. court.  This 
means that U.S. courts end up having to entertain resolution of the case in 
enforcement proceedings.  These proceedings, however, do not afford the 
U.S. court the opportunity to retry the case.310  U.S. courts are generally 
bound by the foreign judgment, unless that judgment violates certain 
circumscribed grounds, such as fraud or violations of U.S. due process 
standards.311 
 
306  Id. 
307  See supra Part III.A.4. 
308  M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How Convenient Is Forum Non 
Conveniens in Transnational Litigation?, 4 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 21, 22 (2007); see also 
Cortelyou Kenney, Comment, Disaster in the Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational 
Human Rights Litigation, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 857, 864 (2009) (“Seeking to evade the prospect of massive 
foreign judgments, corporate defendants subvert the very proceedings they originally sought via [forum 
non conveniens] by attempting to return cases to the forum that granted dismissal.”). 
309  Cf. Kenney, supra note 308, at 876 (“[B]oomerang suits complicate judgment enforcement 
in . . . ways . . . reflective of the inherent difficulties posed by simultaneously litigating the same set of 
issues in different countries.”). 
310  See, e.g., Weininger v. Castro, 462 F. Supp. 2d 457, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The insufficiency of 
evidence in support of a claim is not, in itself, a basis for a collateral due process attack on a 
judgment. . . . [O]therwise, the enforcing court would inevitably be required to reexamine the merits of 
the original controversy, which is plainly not proper in an enforcement proceeding.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting McCloud v. Lawrence Gallery, Ltd., No. 90 Civ. 30(KMW), 1991 WL 136027, 
at *17 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1991)). 
311  See, e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 129, at 1015 (noting that section 4(b) of the Uniform 
Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act “sets forth six . . . grounds that permit, but do not require, a 
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On account of these problems, the Erie doctrine’s twin aims are 
frustrated because the present state of affairs encourages forum shopping 
and inequitable administration of the laws.  In the next section, I construct 
an approach for courts to employ in international conflict-of-laws cases. 
B. Internationalizing Erie in Private International Law Cases 
U.S. courts apply foreign law when appropriate, not out of compulsion 
but out of comity.  As explained by Justice Story, 
[a] state may prohibit the operation of all foreign laws, and the rights growing 
out of them, within its own territories.  It may prohibit some foreign laws, and 
it may admit the operation of others.  It may recognise, and modify, and 
qualify some foreign laws; it may enlarge or give universal effect to others.  It 
may interdict the administration of some foreign laws; it may favour the 
introduction of others.312 
A reconsideration of the Erie doctrine as applied in private 
international law cases is in order because where principles of international 
comity apply as a matter of federal law, they provide “a principle of 
decision binding on federal and state courts alike.”313  Judicial actions 
implicating international comity by definition implicate foreign relations; 
and there is  
no question that at some point an exercise of state power that touches on 
foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s policy, given the 
“concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign nations” that 
animated the Constitution’s allocation of the foreign relations power to the 
National Government in the first place.314   
The definition and enforcement of what comity requires is accordingly one 
of those “few areas involving ‘uniquely federal interests’” that are “so 
committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal 
control” that federal law must supply the rules of decision.315 
 
U.S. court to deny recognition [of a foreign money judgment].  These . . . include lack of notice, fraud, 
public policy, existence of an inconsistent judgment, violation of forum selection clause, and 
inconvenient forum”). 
312  STORY, supra note 22, § 23. 
313  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964). 
314  Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 
n.25); see also, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (invalidating substantive state law 
where its enforcement by state courts could “disturb foreign relations”).  There is no question that 
“complete power over international affairs is in the national government,” and it “cannot be subject to 
any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states.”  United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 
324, 331 (1937); see also, e.g., Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 436 (asserting that “international relations” is a 
“matter[] which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government”). 
315  Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988); see also, e.g., Tex. Indus., Inc. v. 
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (clarifying that federal law governs “international 
disputes implicating . . . our relations with foreign nations”); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425 (“[Issues 
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It should be noted that federal courts sitting in diversity and faced with 
international conflict-of-laws questions need not develop federal conflict-
of-laws rules, even though cases may touch on important international, and 
thus federal, concerns.  As recognized in Shutts, the conflict-of-laws 
process is only implicated when there is a conflict between the laws of 
competing jurisdictions.316  If there is not a conflict, the court may apply 
forum law, assuming that law has at least some constitutional connection to 
the case.317 
If there is a conflict, the role of the federal court should be to critically 
evaluate whether the application of a state’s conflict-of-laws rule supports 
federal objectives.318  Should it support federal objectives, it is well 
established that federal district courts may apply state law, as Sabbatino 
notes, not because of compulsion under Erie and Klaxon but because so 
doing does not thwart federal objectives.319  As such, a federal court may 
choose to follow state conflict-of-laws rules directing it to apply foreign law 
or some other law because the application of that law would not negatively 
impact federal interests. 
It is useful to pause here to take stock of the foregoing analysis before 
offering a new approach.  In two post-Erie cases, Klaxon and Day, the 
Supreme Court required not only the application of state substantive law by 
federal courts sitting in diversity, but also the state conflict-of-laws rules of 
the forum court, even when those rules direct the application of foreign law.  
To the extent that Klaxon rests on sound jurisprudential underpinnings 
because it effectuates Erie’s command to apply state law, that same 
rationale is less applicable in the international context.  In the international 
context, the federal courts have a special competence to create federal 
common law to effectuate national interests.  As such, Sabbatino permits a 
federal district court to develop specialized federal common law in 
international conflicts cases.320  To the extent there is a conflict between the 
 
implicating] our relationships with other members of the international community must be treated 
exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”). 
316  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816 (1985). 
317  See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kamrath, 475 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2007); Nelson v. 
Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 288 F.3d 954, 963 (7th Cir. 2002). 
318  Cf. Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting 
that federal common law, and not the Erie doctrine, applies to litigation that implicates the nation’s 
foreign relations). 
319  See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (“[F]ederal courts should 
‘incorporat[e] [state law] as the federal rule of decision,’ unless ‘application of [the particular] state law 
[in question] would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs.’” (alterations in original) 
(citation omitted)); cf. Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (noting 
that “federal reference to state law will not obtain, of course, in situations in which the state law is 
incompatible with federal interests”). 
320  Federal common law for conflicts cases could be developed as federal common law, which 
would be binding on the states like the act of state doctrine, or as procedural federal common law, which 
would not be binding on the states.  See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 210, at 819–35 (2008) (comparing and 
105:1531  (2011) When Erie Goes International  
 1575
laws contending for application making it necessary for the court to conduct 
a conflict-of-laws analysis, there are two analyses that must be conducted. 
First, the court must analyze the relevant factual contacts to the foreign 
forum.  This would ensure that the application of foreign law would 
comport with the constitutional requirements explained in Hague and 
Shutts.321  Second, the court must undertake a further inquiry to determine 
whether the application of foreign law will effectuate not just local state 
interests but also national federal interests.  If the court concludes that 
national interests are not effectuated or if it concludes that the application of 
foreign law would be unconstitutional, it must locate a jurisdiction that has 
the requisite constitutional contacts with the case such that the application 
of that jurisdiction’s law would effectuate national interests.  In so doing, a 
court may adopt the law of the forum, not because it is required by Klaxon 
and Day but because it makes sense in terms of the federal interests 
implicated by the case.  In fact, there might be many benefits in utilizing 
forum law, such as ease of application and general knowledge on the part of 
the court.  Or, the court may set out to craft a conflicts rule for the case.  A 
court would not be left to totally write on a clean slate because most federal 
courts recognize that for purposes of federal conflicts law the Second 
Restatement controls.322  Furthermore, courts could look to the development 
of the law in the several states.323  In practice, the approach would be as 
follows. 
First, in cases where parties have chosen or stipulated to foreign law, 
the court should apply foreign law so long as it is constitutional and does 
not frustrate federal policies.324 
Second, in cases where parties have not chosen foreign law but that 
law is the only law that has any significant contact with the case, a court 
should engage in a constitutional/federal policy analysis.  Simply because a 
party has chosen to file a case in the United States does not give the federal 
court the requisite significant contact to satisfy constitutional standards.  
 
contrasting substantive and procedural common law and explaining forum non conveniens as an 
example of procedural common law). 
321  See supra Part II.B. 
322  See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)  
(refusing to apply the logic of Klaxon to the choice-of-law question because of the international 
complexion of the case and instead looking to Ninth Circuit caselaw as well as the Second Restatement 
to craft a federal common law rule); see also, e.g., Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th 
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1045 (2004), vacated on other grounds, 374 F.3d 1384 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(illustrating that the court looked to the Second Restatement to determine choice-of-law rules); Bettis v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 332–33 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same). 
323  See, e.g., Hisrich v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc., 226 F.3d 445, 449 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(illustrating the relevance of “restatements of law . . . and the majority rule among other states” in 
resolving underdeveloped questions of law). 
324  See, e.g., Am. Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Dev. Co., 122 F.3d 130, 133–34 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“[W]here the parties have agreed to the application of the forum law, their consent concludes the choice 
of law inquiry.”). 
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Indeed, such cases might be appropriate for forum non conveniens.  
Because the forum and the United States as a whole may have no 
significant interest in the case, it might be more convenient to try the case 
elsewhere.  Such a limited role for forum non conveniens may alleviate 
some of the concerns that have been recently expressed about the doctrine’s 
use.325 
Third, if foreign law is selected in a state that follows the First 
Restatement and if there are contacts with the forum state or another U.S. 
state, the court could apply a federal conflict-of-laws rule.  In so doing, a 
court would concern itself not just with forum interests but with the 
interests of the U.S. writ large that are implicated by the court’s decision.  If 
the court finds that federal interests would not be advanced by the 
application of the state’s conflicts rules, it may again choose to dismiss in 
favor of a foreign forum or it may apply another law that would effectuate 
those interests. 
Fourth and finally, in a case where there are multiple contacts because 
the case has been filed in a state that engages in some form of interest 
analysis, a federal court should seek to accommodate the varying federal 
interests at stake in the case.  In developing federal policy, it would be 
useful to look at the laws of the several states, the Second Restatement, and 
the ongoing development of the common law.326  Of course, this approach 
would not prevent Congress from stepping in to remedy these problems. 
While this approach is preferable to the present approach employed by 
courts, it is not without objections.  The primary objection can be seen in 
recent writings regarding the application of customary international law by 
federal courts.  As noted, perhaps the leading commentators on this point 
have been Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith.327  They have argued that the 
requirements of the Erie doctrine apply in full force to international matters 
implicating customary international law.328  The reasons advanced for this 
are threefold. 
They argue in the first place that Erie’s “embrace of legal 
positivism . . . requires federal courts to identify the sovereign source for 
every rule of decision.  Because the appropriate ‘sovereigns’ under the U.S. 
 
325  See supra Part III.A.4. 
326  See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., Ill. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594, 615 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(illustrating such an approach); see also Lea Brilmayer, The Problem of Provenance: The Proper Place 
of Ethical Reasoning in Selection of the Applicable Law, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Donald Earl Childress III ed., 2011) (articulating a common law approach to private international 
law). 
327  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 29, at 852–55.  Interestingly, Jack Goldsmith has made a 
slightly different argument in another article.  See Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 54, at 687 (“The 
claimed historical connection [between legal positivism and the Erie decision] fails to explain why there 
was a large temporal gap between the general acceptance of legal positivism and the decision in Erie.  
By itself, this gap makes a causal role for positivism seem doubtful.”). 
328  Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 29, at 853–54. 
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Constitution are the federal government and the states, all law applied by 
federal courts must be either federal law or state law.”329  Second, they 
argue that Erie evinces a legal realist view of judicial decisionmaking. 
In the rhetoric, if not the reality, of the Swift regime, judicial decisionmaking 
was not a form of lawmaking.  Erie rejected this view when it interpreted the 
term “laws” in the Rules of Decision Act to include state judicial decisions.  
The recognition that courts “make” law when they engage in common law 
decisionmaking also formed a basis for the Court’s conclusion that the 
development of an independent general common law by federal courts was “an 
unconstitutional assumption of powers.”330 
Third, they explain that 
Erie did not eliminate the lawmaking powers of federal courts—it changed 
them.  Federal court development of general common law was illegitimate not 
because it was a form of lawmaking, but rather because it was unauthorized 
lawmaking.  Thus, federal judicial lawmaking is consistent with Erie if it is 
legitimately authorized.  Since Erie, federal courts have determined that such 
authorization exists in a variety of circumstances.331 
But the critique they offer, while powerful in the context of customary 
international law, does not necessarily lend itself to private international 
law cases.  First, in applying conflict-of-laws rules, courts are applying law 
that has a basis in state authority.  The conflict-of-laws process is a process 
that directs a court to the application of a state’s law; it does not determine 
the content of that law.  As such, conflict-of-laws analysis is designed to 
help a court choose which sovereign’s law should control the case.  
Furthermore, and as they note, the law to be applied by the federal courts is 
either federal law or state law.  What role does foreign law have in their 
analyses, especially when state conflict-of-laws rules require its 
application?  That open question illustrates that Erie’s concern with 
positivism is more about positive federal and state law than it is about the 
application of foreign law. 
Second, regarding the argument that Erie rejected the ability of federal 
courts to make common law, in the private international law context federal 
courts have at least some limited power to create federal common law.  It 
does not, therefore, amount to an unconstitutional assumption of powers for 
courts to develop federal common law in this limited area.  As Caleb 
Nelson has explained, “[p]roperly understood . . . Erie does not deny the 
ability of lawyers and judges, drawing upon precedents and practices 
followed in diverse jurisdictions, to distill rules that are available for legal 
recognition and that are sufficiently determinate to be ‘law-like.’”332  In any 
 
329  Id. at 852. 
330  Id. at 854 (footnotes omitted). 
331  Id. at 855. 
332  Nelson, supra note 205, at 504. 
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event, the gist of Bradley and Goldsmith’s trenchant argument is that 
federal courts should not be in the business of creating law post-Erie, even 
in cases of an international dimension given that such powers are 
committed to the political branches.  I agree, but note that the application of 
foreign law by U.S. courts operating under state conflict-of-laws rules poses 
a similar dilemma.  That dilemma is that the court may be required to apply 
the law of a country for whom it does not speak.  There may be good 
reasons for the court to apply foreign law—comity, fairness, party 
expectations, or international relations concerns—but the court should not 
be forced to do so under the Erie doctrine.  Indeed, forcing a federal court 
to apply foreign law may lead to forum non conveniens dismissals that do 
not effectuate the important federal goals at stake in international cases.333 
Finally, where principles of international comity apply as a matter of 
federal law, they provide “a principle of decision binding on federal and 
state courts alike.”334  Judicial actions implicating international comity by 
definition implicate foreign relations; and there is 
no question that at some point an exercise of state power that touches on 
foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s policy, given the 
“concern for uniformity in this country’s dealings with foreign nations” that 
animated the Constitution’s allocation of the foreign relations power to the 
National Government in the first place.335 
The definition and enforcement of what comity requires is accordingly 
one of those “few areas involving ‘uniquely federal interests’” that are “so 
committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal 
control” that federal law must supply the rules of decision.336 
This approach would clarify and systematize much of the judicial 
decisionmaking in this area.  As noted above, courts are frequently reticent 
to deal with cases involving foreign parties or injuries.337  Their reticence is 
in part due to the problems they face in applying foreign law.  That is why 
 
333  See supra Part III.A.4. 
334  Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964). 
335  American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413 (2003) (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 
427 n.25); see also, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968).  There is no question that 
“complete power over international affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject 
to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states.” United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 
324, 331 (1937); see also, e.g., Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 436 (stating that “international relations” is a 
“matter[] which the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal Government”); United States v. Pink, 315 
U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (“Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national 
government exclusively.”). 
336  Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff 
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)); see also, e.g., Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 641 (federal law 
governs “international disputes implicating . . . our relations with foreign nations”); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
at 425 (issues implicating “our relationships with other members of the international community must be 
treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law”). 
337  See supra Part III.A.4. 
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many courts choose to dismiss cases on grounds of forum non conveniens.  
While we are still early in the renewed use of this doctrine, it is possible 
that the negative impact of dealing with cases through that doctrine will 
come to the forefront in years to come.  While it may have been the case in 
the past that many cases dismissed under the doctrine were never refiled in 
a foreign court,338 today many cases are indeed brought in foreign fora after 
dismissal.339  These cases later end up before U.S. courts in enforcement of 
judgment proceedings.  At that point in the process, the federal court is not 
supposed to undertake a searching review of the application of foreign law 
to the facts of the case, but rather is to make sure that the judgment was 
rendered in an appropriate fashion.  Thus, federal courts may tie their hands 
in resolving disputes by dismissing cases under the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens for fear of applying foreign law, only to be required to apply 
foreign law on the back end through the enforcement of judgments process.  
It would be better for courts to deal with the foreign law issue up front 
rather than through such a cursory and belated review. 
Another hope would be that some consistency would be provided in 
international cases.  As mentioned above, there are various inconsistent 
rules being applied by the several states in this area.340  Consistency in this 
area would do much to encourage Erie’s twin aims of discouraging forum 
shopping and encouraging a more equal administration of the laws.  Finally, 
this approach would advance the cause of separating domestic from 
international conflicts.341  In separating these cases, more appropriate rules 
and approaches could be developed for transnational cases. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored the questions raised by the application of the 
Erie doctrine in international conflict-of-laws cases.  Besides showing that 
the Erie doctrine should not be read as automatically requiring the uncritical 
application of foreign law in international conflicts cases, it has put forward 
a suggested approach through which courts might more forthrightly engage 
in analyzing international conflicts cases.  Part of the important problem 
identified in this Article is that the internationalization of the Erie doctrine 
may be one way to account for the increasing and problematic use of the 
forum non conveniens doctrine in modern caselaw.  Further work remains 
to be done to fine tune this approach in actual cases, and this Article should 
thus be seen as a first step in that direction.  Further work also remains to be 
done analyzing the continued application of foreign law in domestic cases 
and the relationship of those decisions to the doctrine of forum non 
 
338  See, e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 129, at 415–17. 
339  See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 236. 
340  See supra Part IV.A. 
341  Laycock, supra note 15, at 259; see also Ehrenzweig, supra note 296, at 723. 
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conveniens.  Notwithstanding these issues, the hope is that by bringing the 
question more explicitly to the forefront in scholarly study it will lead to 
better outcomes in international conflict-of-laws cases adjudicated by 
courts. 
